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PAST AND FUTURE: THE TEMPORAL
DIMENSION IN THE LAW OF
PROPERTY*
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN**
All human interactions, and hence all legal rules, have a temporal di-
mension. Offer precedes acceptance; cause precedes effect; parents are
born before their children. It is unremarkable for the entitlements of
today to depend upon the events of yesterday. It would be inconceivable
for them to depend upon the events of tomorrow. Time marches on, and
in one direction, forward. When Kant said that time and space are fun-
damental categories for organizing all human experience, he spoke as
much about the law as he did about physics, biology or history.
This paper deals with time in two separate senses. In one sense, it is
about how the categorical nature of time, as a necessary element of
human experience and comprehension, shapes substantive and proce-
dural legal rules. In a second sense, however, the larger part of this essay
focuses on the contingent nature of time, that is, about the length of in-
terval between cause and effect, between antecedent and consequence.
These questions of degree raise issues where empirical guesses must fill in
the gaps left by general theory. The passage of time between the opera-
tive facts on which liability rests and the onset or resolution of a lawsuit
may be long or short; yet large bodies of law turn on the length of that
interval, not simply on its direction. Time may cure some ills, but it
exacerbates others. The legal treatment of temporal issues cuts across
the traditional substantive categories of the law: property, contracts,
torts and restitution. It also cuts across procedure and evidence. The
purpose of this paper is to explore the legal response to the temporal
dimension in the law of property.
The central theme of the paper is simple. The major cost associated
with the passage of time is uncertainty. For risk averse individuals, that
* Prepared for the Liberty Fund, Inc. Symposium on Time, Property Rights, and the
Common Law, Nov. 14-17, 1985, administered by the Law and Economics Center, George Mason
University, Arlington, Virginia.
** James Parker Hall Professor of Law, University of Chicago. I should like to thank Bernard
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uncertainty creates a cost that greater certainty could reduce. In addi-
tion, any increase of uncertainty increases the scope of the discretion
lodged in both public and private hands. That discretion spurs private
litigation that generates high administrative costs and high error rates.
The passage of time therefore creates pressures, both public and private,
to take steps to ensure that legal rights and duties do not depend on
events that are remote from the present, either past or future. These
practical demands often clash with the strict principles of corrective jus-
tice, where the passage of time is of no particular consequence in deter-
mining the relative rights and duties of all persons. As an abstract
principle each violation of individual rights appears to require full re-
dress on a case by case basis. The ungainly structure of legal doctrine is
sometimes explained by the difficult task of reconciling these two incon-
sistent tendencies in a wide range of specific contexts.
Part I looks backward to the past, at the rules that govern the acquisi-
tion of property and the limitations of actions: first possession and ad-
verse possession are its main subjects. Here I argue first that the rule of
first possession, though widely ignored historically, offers the best way to
establish the priority of rights in external things. That first possession
principle is in turn restrained by statutes of limitation, which lie at the
core of the law of adverse possession doctrines. The analysis of their
function in clearing title and facilitating voluntary transactions com-
pletes the analysis of this section.
Part II looks forward and analyzes the various rules that govern the
disposition of property in the future. Here I argue that the common law
rule of absolute ownership, including the absolute power of disposition at
death, is the second part of a coherent system of private rights that be-
gins with the rules of first possession. The only social justification for
limiting the right of private parties to create whatever interests they
choose is the need to protect strangers to the title. As that goal can be
accomplished cleanly by trust and recordation devices, the traditional
rule against perpetuities and the parallel rules limiting consensual re-
straints against alienation should be abolished. Removing these fetters
upon private grant, however, does not determine the structure of con-
tracts regulating future conduct. As the number of contingencies be-
comes more difficult to control and to plot, there is a shift from rules that
specify performance-so called complete contingent state contracts-to
rules that set up governance structures for making the appropriate deci-
sions on the strength of subsequently acquired information. Temporal
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uncertainty thus accounts for the emergence of private governance and
within the political realm for constitutionalism writ large.
I. LOOKING BACKWARD: FIRST POSSESSION
AND ADVERSE POSSESSION
A. First Possession: Prior in Time is Higher in Right
Temporal issues arise with evident urgency in the law of real property.
Land itself lasts forever, and the improvements upon it can last for a very
long time. The durability of the asset means that no one person can con-
sume it in a lifetime, so that any legal relations with respect to land will
of necessity involve a large number of persons over a long period of time.
How then are these relationships to be sorted out?
Every one knows and follows the rule of ordinary life that applies to
such prosaic matters as waiting in line for theater tickets or in a cafeteria:
"first come, first served." The rule of first possession at common law
converts that intuition into the analytical foundation for the entire sys-
tem of private property: the party who takes first possession of a thing is
entitled to exclude the rest of the world from it, forever. The element of
time is part of the priority rule and of the definition of the property inter-
est acquired.'
The rationales for this rule are many and complex. Often the rule has
been regarded as something akin to a self-evident truth. But the rule also
has clear political and utilitarian virtues that account for its lofty status.
These deserve to be mentioned briefly. The first possession rule promotes
a system of decentralized ownership: private actions by private parties
shape the individual entitlements in ways that do not involve the active
role of the state, whose job, as umpire, is neatly restricted to protecting
entitlements previously acquired by private means. The rule thus allows
one to organize a system of rights that is not dependent upon the whim
of the sovereign, and makes it possible to oppose on normative grounds
the all too frequent historical truth that ownership rights rest upon suc-
cessful conquest, nothing more and nothing less. It is not surprising
therefore that a variant of the first possession rule exerted so large an
influence in the writing of John Locke, whose political mission was to
defend a theory of representative government against the power of the
I For caveats on the historical use of the law, especially with respect to land, see infra notes
52-74 and accompanying text.
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Crown.2
The first possession rule also has more direct economic virtues for it
yields a consistent and exhaustive set of property rights, whereby every-
thing has in principle one, and only one, owner. Vesting ownership in
the first possessor makes it highly likely that a person who owns the land
will use it efficiently and protect it diligently. At every stage the rule
reduces transaction costs. There is no need for a routine lawsuit for the
true owner, however identified, to pry property away from the party in
wrongful possession. The uniqueness of owners means that development
and sale can take place at relatively low cost. The first possession rule
does give rise to serious problems in the case of common-pool assets,
such as oil, gas and fish. Yet even here it furnishes a baseline of entitle-
ments which permits the state to organize forced exchanges that on aver-
age work to the long-term advantage of persons with interests in the
pool.3
This paper, however, stresses the temporal feature of the rule. Any
determination of ownership maps external facts into a decision rule on
entitlements. The first possession rule represents an ingenious, if intui-
tive, recognition that time provides the best one dimensional ruler for
making the needed mapping. Time offers a unique measuring rod, suffi-
cient in principle to resolve two or two thousand competing claims for
priority. Whoever got there first, wins. Except in the improbable case of
ties, an enormous decision-making capability is contained in a single va-
riable. Getting a lot of results out of a little bit of information surely
enhances the overall efficiency of the system.
Consider an alternative rule that requires someone to map from n dif-
ferent dimensions to a single answer. The balancing of factors requires
tradeoffs amongst incommensurates that breed uncertainty and, with it,
litigation: there is no way to map a plane into a line, while preserving a
one-to-one correspondence between the points in the plan and those in
the line.4 Yet making a clear decision one way or the other is of enor-
2. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETI'ER CONCERN-
ING TOLERANCE 3-4 (J. W. Gough ed. 1946).
3. 1 explore these at some length in R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN ch. 15 (1985) [hereinafter cited as EPSTEIN, TAKINGS]. On oil and
gas see Libecap and Wiggins, The Influence of Private Contractual Failure of Regulation: The Case
of Oil Field Unitization, 93 J. POL. ECON. 690 (1985) (noting that the private forces that oppose
unitization by contract tend to work to defeat it by regulation).
4. Thus points on a line (say, the x-axis) can be represented by a single variable (a, 0). where
the full information about the location of the point is generated by knowledge ofa. When the points
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mous importance. The relatively automatic quality of the first possession
rule helps private parties organize their affairs without resorting to litiga-
tion. The point should not be overstated, for the first possession rule will
not eliminate every factual dispute over who took possession of the land
first. Land has a large physical dimension. One person may enter land
first, while (with or without knowledge of this entry) another stakes out a
claim to the same parcel or part thereof. The problem can be especially
acute with mining claims. No legal rule can solve all borderline cases
where individuals act in ignorance or disregard of what others have done.
As the enormous nineteenth century debates on possession indicate,'
once "possession" becomes the source of rights and duties, it becomes
subject to heavy verbal stress.6
But so what? The mark of a good legal rule is not whether it resolves
all doubtful cases at the margin. No rule can fully capture the distinction
between the occasional use of unowned land and its occupation,7 between
the acquisition of full ownership and the claim of limited (e.g. hunting)
rights. Yet all of these complications are manageable if the rule gener-
ates enough clear cases in routine situations. No one says that the doc-
trine of adverse possession should be scrapped because it generates close
cases on the question of what counts as possession. The linguistic doubt
is not allowed to dismantle the substantive doctrine. The same is true of
first possession. It provides a marked degree of decisional stability,
which is all that can be asked. Any more complicated rule would doubt-
less have a temporal component to it: for example, a rule that awards
can lie anywhere in the x, y plane, the unique description is now (a,b), where both can vary simulta-
neously. One way to plot (a,b) into (a) is treat (b) as a constant when it is a variable. Any other
mapping (say the sum, a + b) will provide a unique mapping from the plane to the line. But
information will be lost as it is impossible to reconstruct the point of the plane knowing only the
point on the line.
5. See, e.g., O.W. HOLMES, The Bailee at Common Law, in THE COMMON LAW (1881); and
on seisin, its rough parallel for land, see 2 F. POLLOCK & F.W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENGI ISH LAW, ch. 4, § 2 (2d ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND].
6. See Simpson, The Analysis of Legal Concepts, 80 L.Q. REv. 535 (1964).
7. See, e.g., Brumagim v. Bradshaw, 39 Cal. 24 (1870), where fencing three sides of the land
was sufficient where the fourth was protected by natural barriers. The headnotes give some sense of
the law:
Actual possession of land can only be taken by such open, unequivocal and notorious acts
of dominion, as plainly indicate to the public that he who performs them has appropriated
the land, and claims the exclusive dominion over it. A substantial, artificial inclosure,
erected around the entire tract, is such an act of dominion.... An inclosure, partly by
natural and party by artificial barriers, will under certain circumstances, likewise establish
an actual possession.
Id. at 25.
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ownership to the party who, after enclosure, first makes substantial use of
unowned land, unless the prior party in possession had been there a long
time.8
Who needs it? How much of a temporal priority is needed to offset a
substantial use? The rule could only survive because the two features of
original acquisition and substantial use are positively correlated, which is
itself an argument for making the earlier fact decisive on the question of
ownership. The demands for "substantial use" could only induce a
proliferation of borderline cases that place ownership (and hence the
right to use and dispose) in limbo until the question of substantial use is
resolved. Delay has its costs. A sound system of rights resolves the
claims of ownership early in the process to reduce the legal uncertainty
in subsequent decisions on investment and consumption. Any system of
ownership (including state grants) requires that some positive costs be
incurred to establish claims. These costs should be minimized in order to
reserve the bulk of resources for the productive use of assets. The first
possession rule itself can encourage the premature acquisition of inter-
ests, but that cost is tolerable in light of the alternatives. Any system of
state grants transfers the cost of land acquisition from the open field to
the legislature; while any alternative rule of private acquisition, such as
first substantial use, only increases the fraction of resources that must be
devoted to the acquisition of claims.9 The need for an early determina-
tion of entitlements has been made with great force by Professor Kitch in
his "prospect" theory of patents, which he developed in large measure by
analogy to the first possession rule applied to land and mining claims at
common law."0 It applies with equal force in the more general case.
8. This rule is suggested by many land use statutes which state in essence that development
rights are lost unless they are used by the passage of the statute or some other fixed time. See, e.g.,
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE, § 21170(a) (Deering 1977).
9. The point also has assumed great relevance with respect to many modern land use control
statutes, which prevent the development of land after the passage of certain enactments, unless sub-
stantial development had taken place before. One consequence of these statutes is to encourage
premature development in order to perfect rights that are otherwise inchoate. The same tendency
arises with the disposition of land. In 1978, when there was talk in Chicago of an ordinance prohib-
iting the conversions of rental properties to condominiums, many projects converted early in order
to beat (or at least obtain a leg up on) the statute.
10. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J. L. & ECON. 265 (1977). The
hard question is precisely where along the continuum of development the rights should be said to
vest. Yet debates on that point should not be allowed to obscure the central point that all arguments
presuppose some system of decentralized acquisition that rest at root upon first possession. The
patent office simply provides a central registry that is necessary to structure priority, given that
inventions are intangibles that cannot be reduced to physical possession.
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To a modem lawyer all this talk about first possession seems to have
no practical interest. After all, historically most land was acquired by
grants from the state; and there are few among us who have acquired
even a tiny fraction of our assets by first possession. More to the point,
while litigation over possession was commonplace in the nineteenth cen-
tury, it is far less frequent today: reliable surveying has put it largely to
rest with respect to land. Litigation of the sort found in Pierson v. Post,I
which involved the claims of two rival hunters for the capture of a wild
fox, is effectively precluded because the combined costs of suit are sure to
be greater than the value of the (single) fox.
It is, however, misleading to measure the importance of a rule solely
by its frequency in litigation.' 2 The major effect of the first possession
rule lies in its relation to a general theory of entitlements. While most
individuals claim property directly by transfer, their title is in principle
no better than the title of their transferor. In order to make out a good
claim of title, therefore, one is often driven back to the root of title. In
some cases that means tracing the title back to the person who has ac-
quired property by original acquisition. In other cases that means a title
acquired by grant from the sovereign, who in a virtuous world has ac-
quired sovereignty either by grant or by original occupation.13 At a nor-
mative level, the first possession rule precludes totally the acquisition of
title by adverse possession. If no person is able to profit by his own
wrong, then acts of adverse possession are by definition out of bounds,
are flatly illegal, whether done by private parties or by the state.
Original acquisition starts the process by creating rights against the
11. 3 Cai. R. 175, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
12. A point I have stressed before, see Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules,
95 HARV. L, REv. 1717 (1982).
13. Note that the subject of the natural acquisition of land never developed in England because
of the dominant position of the Crown.
Of the occupation of unowned land we have not to speak, for no land is or can be unowned.
Thi, rule seems to be implied in the principle that the king is lord of all England. What is
not held of him by some tenant of his is held by him in demesne. In all probability no
tenant can abandon the land that he has been holding in such wise as to leave it open to the
occupation of any one who sees fit to take it to himself.
2 PO t OCK & MxritAND, supra note 5, at 80-81.
Maitland then traces the prospects of the "'general occupant." An estate pur autre vie is created
when ,.1, a tenant for life conveys to B, for life. B predeceases A. Until the death of A who owns the
land? In principle it could be taken by first possession, that is, filled by the general occupant. To be
sure, the gap itself is a small one, but nonetheless even here there is the tendency to avoid occupation
b) allowing (against strict theory) C to devise the land, even though he has no heritable estate, or
implying a reversion in B's heirs where C has not so done. Id. at 81.
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world. Within a framework of corrective justice, the passage of time,
without more, has no influence upon the rights or duties of the parties to
any dispute. Time is a wholly neutral factor, as the system operates upon
the assumption that individual rights and duties are a function solely of
individual actions, to which personal credit or responsibility can be as-
signed. Thereafter, only voluntary acts of transfer (including transfer at
death) can change the status of the legal title, while only acts of aggres-
sion (or deceit) by outsiders can give owners tort remedies against
strangers.
In Anarchy, State and Utopia, Robert Nozick offers a historical ac-
count of justice, which is consistent with his theoretical perspective, but
which is in no way sensitive to questions of temporal degree: rights are
strictly determined by temporal priority.' 4 The older the title, the better
the title-period. Sequence is everything; the magnitude of the interval is
nothing.
Nozick's view of the first possession rule, like his view of entitlements
generally, closely follows the pattern of common-law rules of entitle-
ments. Yet his analysis, as a species of ideal theory, fails to recognize
that no system of justice works without frictions. These frictions gener-
ate a set of counterprinciples that are as important as the basic entitle-
ments they limit. As a matter of high principle, what comes first is best;
as a matter of evidence and proof, however, what comes last is more
reliable and certain. As a result, any operating legal system responds to a
powerful pressure to make everything turn on events that lie in or close
to the present. Time dims recollections and allows people to forget or to
suppress unpleasant evidence. It does not take a profound knowledge of
human cognition or motivation to conclude that all evidence decays with
time. One could quarrel over rate of decay. The decay function may or
may not be linear, but it surely increases monotonically with time, and
for many types of evidence it is probably steep. What should be done to
counter the problem?
B. Adverse Possession
1. Tension Between Principle and Proof
The conflict between principle and proof manifests itself in the law of
adverse possession. That body of law could scarcely arise in a world of
zero transaction costs, for the true owner could always put the adverse
14. R. NozCic, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
[Vol. 64:667
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol64/iss3/3
Number 3] THE TEMPORAL DIMENSION IN THE LAW OF PROPERTY 675
possessor out instantly and regain possession of the land. When transac-
tion costs are zero the wrongdoer will always be identified, and litigation
will be error free. But practical frictions can dominate the system and
shape its legal rules. Wrongs are not always instantly uncovered; it takes
money to identify a wrongdoer, and more money to bring a suit, which
could be erroneously decided. As time passes, it is more likely that the
original or subsequent title will be split (by deed, and especially by will)
amongst a large number of individuals, making management of a suit
clumsy and awkward. With time, memories fade and witnesses die: no
one can recall who did what to whom. Time forces a greater reliance
upon documentary evidence, and even that may be forged, lost, altered or
destroyed.
Nonetheless in the interim, there remains a pressing need to preserve
the semblance of well-ordered property rights. It would not do to allow
a free-for-all once land passed out of the hands of its rightful owner, for
then the productive value of the land is diminished for all time. Using
the doctrine of relative title, of prior (not first) possession, to confer rights
upon the adverse possessor against the rest of the world has the same
virtues that the doctrine of first possession has with respect to land origi-
nally unowned. The doctrine of relative title gives a clear and expedi-
tious temporal rule to resolve conflicting claims, even by adverse
possessors whose claims are precarious against that of the true (that is,
any other prior) owner. The party in possession trumps the claims of any
stranger to the title.
The rule of relative title was moreover of enormous importance in the
formative era of real property. It does not take a close reading of either
the Roman texts or the early English writs and cases to realize that the
dominant issue in the early law of real property was forcible disposses-
sion, or the illegal occupation of abandoned or unoccupied property.
Early land law, closely tied to the order and security of the realm, pos-
sessed a public as well as private character. This is one central lesson in
the Roman law of usucapio,'5 and it is repeated in the early English
writs-the writ of right, and of novel disseisin, which were drafted as a
matter of high politics in the reign of Henry II.6 While the Roman and
15. See the discussion in J. NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW (1962). Key
passages on usucapio are found in 2 THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUs 68-73 (Francis de Zulueta trans.
1946).
16. See F.W. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW (A.H. Chaytor & W.J.
Whittaker eds. 1936).
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English rules themselves differ on points of detail, they all reach the right
theoretical result on the central issue: the adverse possessor has rights
against the rest of the world from the moment that he claims possession.
A system with an indefinite suspension of rights could not work when
titles were routinely precarious. The rule of first possession may have
had little historical relevance to original acquisition. But it survives as
the only rule of acquisition that protects the adverse possessor against all
but the true owner.
What about the claim of the original owner against the adverse posses-
sor? Here the pragmatic questions of proof are in systematic tension
with the remorseless doctrines of original acquisition. In this situation, it
is quite possible that the benefit of making the right determination de-
creases with time, given the way in which it disrupts present expectations
of an adverse possessor who may well have improved or developed the
land. Yet even if the benefits of restoring the original owner remain
roughly constant over time, the basic point remains unchanged. The
costs of making that determination continue to mount over time, so that
at some point the lines cross, so that it ceases to be worthwhile to deter-
mine the facts on which an original and remote claim of right rests.
To be sure, one could try to compromise the difference by imposing
new or heavier burdens of proof upon the plaintiff, or by making certain
types of evidence (e.g., a purported deed to the property) necessary to
establish the claim. Yet these intermediate solutions, taken by them-
selves, are defective. The passage of time does not work to the equal
disadvantage of both sides. Indeed to say that the change of time frame
has no effect at all on the outcome is a contradiction in terms. To the
contrary, the passage of time, like any other reduction in the quality of
evidence, produces a systematic bias for the weaker side.
To see the point, one can think of a tennis match between two profes-
sionals. Normally, one expects the better player to win. Yet if the game
is played on a rough surface, an element of randomness is introduced
into the contest, shifting the odds back towards even, which thus works
systematically in favor of the inferior player. In the extreme case (for
instance, where the game is played in a junkyard or on the side of a cliff),
the random elements completely dominate the skill elements; and the
results of the game have little correlation to the players' skills. Litigation
is like that. The passage of time tends to help the party with the weaker
case by giving greater prominence to the random elements of the case.
The moving party sues because there is some scrap of evidence that sup-
[Vol. 64:667
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol64/iss3/3
Number 3] THE TEMPORAL DIMENSION IN THE LAW OF PROPERTY 677
ports the claim, while all evidence on the other side is lost or misinter-
preted. To avoid these situations, at some point it becomes necessary to
end litigation, not to redefine its parameters. Hence the case for the stat-
utes of limitations that lie at the core of the modem judicial doctrines of
adverse possession.
The statute of limitations should be evaluated from the same institu-
tional perspective that is brought to the first possession rule. The key
value of the rule does not derive from the way it handles doubtful cases
at the margin. It stems from the way in which the well-crafted statute of
limitations shapes the primary conduct of private parties, thus preventing
certain kinds of cases from being litigated at all. The point is not novel
and was well brought out over sixty-five years ago by Ballantine, who in
two brief paragraphs was able to articulate the tension between the
search for perfect justice in a world of imperfect institutions:
Title by adverse possession sounds, at first blush, like title by theft or rob-
bery, a primitive method of acquiring land without paying for it. When the
novice is told that by the weight of authority not even good faith is a requi-
site, the doctrine apparently affords an anomalous instance of maturing a
wrong into a right contrary to one of the most fundamental axioms of the
law.
"For true it is, that neither fraud nor might can make a title where there
wanteth right."
The policy of statutes of limitation is something not always clearly appre-
ciated. Dean Ames, in contrasting prescription in the civil law with adverse
possession in our law, remarks: "English lawyers regard not the merit of
the possessor, but the demerit of the one out of possession." It has been
suggested, on the other hand, that the policy is to reward those using the
land in a way beneficial to the community. This takes too much account of
the individual case. The statute has not for its object to reward the diligent
trespasser for his wrong nor yet to penalize the negligent and dormant
owner for sleeping upon his rights; the great purpose is automatically to
quiet all titles which are openly and consistently asserted, to provide proof
of meritorious titles, and correct errors in conveyancing.1 7
Ballantine is right to regard the choice between merit and demerit the-
ories as a second order problem.'" He is also right on the institutional
17. Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, 32 HARV. L. REV. 135 (1918) (footnotes omitted).
18. Thus the issue of merit or demerit arises, for example, when there are successive acts of
adverse possession, when the limitation period has run against the first adverse possessor, but not
separately against the party who has taken the property from him. Sometimes the question is stated
as one of "tacking," i.e. can the second adverse possessor tack the time of possession of the first
adverse possessor onto his own. The merit position denies the tacking and says that the original
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significance of statutes of limitations. The statute spares the rightful
owner the costs of litigation that might otherwise be needed to establish
title. The statute protects aginst claims that are most potent in principle,
but most dubious in fact. It thus enhances the marketability of title by
shortening the period during which prospective purchasers and lenders
(both noted for their squeamishness) need examine the state of the title.
That squeamishness arises from the enormous practical difference be-
tween a perfect title and a flawed one, however small the flaw. There is a
real discontinuity at the origin, which is not replicated elsewhere in the
distribution. Any doubt about the status of the title requires that every-
one must shift from the deterministic to the probabilistic mode. Some-
one must estimate the extent of the risk, which is itself no trivial
problem. Small risks are hard to measure, and they may provide telltale
evidence of major weakness in the title. The minimum loss to uncer-
tainty therefore is not the expected value of the defect in the title, but
some threshold level of the legal and business expenses necessary to esti-
mate it. These costs are greatest where the clouds on the title are oldest.
The statute of limitations generally avoids these title-clearing costs.
Most critically it avoids them where title is in fact impeccable. The stat-
ute induces individuals to bring suit early, when it is more likely to be
manageable, and the outcome correct. So viewed, protection of the
guilty is not an end in itself, but the inevitable and necessary price paid in
discharging the primary function of protecting those with proper title.
"It is better to favor some unjust than to vex many just occupiers."' 9
What drives the statute is the need to control high administrative error
and transactions costs. The statute's effectiveness would be wholly un-
dermined if it were used to bar only invalid claims, for then the statute
would bar claims only after they are litigated, when it is too late. The
doctrine of adverse possession accepts the principle, prior in time is
higher in right; but it marries this principle to a procedural system that
owner wins because the new adverse possessor has not established the merit of his own claim. The
demerit position allows tacking and says the new adverse possessor wins because the original owner
has not cured his demerit of waiting too long. I clearly prefer the second answer to the question as a
way to eliminate the staleness of old claims. Ballantine himself seemed to move in that direction,
with perhaps unnecessary caution: "As a broad question of legislative policy, however, it may per-
haps be advisable to bar stale demands without requiring proof of privity of estate between successive
holders." Id. at 158.
In modem times the entire question is of diminishing importance. Anyone who consults a lawyer
will bring suit quickly, and not count on the remote chance of a subsequent and independent dispos-
session in order to reassert his original title.
19. Id. at 136. The quote is attributed to Frederick Pollock.
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makes it unnecessary to run the full course in order to establish the
needed temporal priority. The contradiction between corrective justice
and statutes of limitations is overcome because the error rate, when mea-
sured against the ideal of a rule of first possession, is lower with the stat-
ute of limitations than it is without it.
The theoretical justification for the general statute can, I think, be
neatly explained by an analogy to the general principles of forced ex-
changes that dominate the law of eminent domain. The system of correc-
tive justice provides all individuals with a framework of rights based
upon the rules of first possession and voluntary subsequent transfer. The
question is whether the removal of some of these rights through general
rule can be justified on the ground that the shift in entitlement increases
the overall utility of each individual, roughly in proportion to his original
holdings.20 With statutes of limitations generally, it is difficult to think of
any important component of subjective value that would require distin-
guishing between wealth and utility in estimating the value in prior enti-
tlements. While there are subjective values in the ownership of land,
they can be fully protected by bringing timely suit. The question with
statutes of limitations, as with other general rules, reduces therefore to
this question: is the protection that each party is afforded ex ante by a
statute of limitations worth more than the right of action that he might
otherwise possess?
The argument in favor of statutes of limitations in the abstract is very
simple. The reduction in error, administrative and transaction costs
brings about a gain that can be shared by all parties to the system. In a
world where everyone has an equal probability of being plaintiff or de-
fendant, the shift in the laws should work to universal advantage. In a
world in which some persons have a systematic bias to take the property
of others, the question is less clear cut, for scoundrels may get (net) bene-
fit from the limitations period. But even here the overall gains from the
statute seem so large that a substantial portion must inure to everyone
subject to the rules in question. Everyone shares, for example, in the
20. In EPSTrIN, TAKINGS, supra note 3. at chs. 12 & 14, I argue that the function of the just
compensation limitation is to insure that every person is left at least as well off after the loss of
property rights, of which the right to recover real property is surely one. In addition, the public use
requirement, although generally neglected in the literature, has the explicit function of dividing the
surplus thus created pro rata. That last element is needed to make property rights as definite after
forced exchanges as before in order to control rent seeking over the surplus. I have recently applied
this same theory to taxation. See Epstein, Taxation in a Lockean World, 4 Soc. PHIl.. & PO.'y 49
(1986).
Washington University Open Scholarship
680 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
reduction in the administrative costs of operating the system; and they
retain their full rights of suit where these have their greatest value.
Those individuals who break the rules most frequently can be subject to
additional sanctions, whether criminal penalties or punitive damages,
within the limitation period to equalize the overall gains.
The real questions are not whether a statute of limitations in the round
works some Pareto superior move. Instead, the harder question is one of
fine tuning. What is the best way to structure the rules of adverse posses-
sion in order to maximize the general gain? Here in principle the usual
caveats apply. One wants to consider this question, ex ante, both for the
individual and for the aggregate. But as all players operate pretty much
behind the veil of ignorance, with adverse possession it is possible to in-
dulge a useful simplification not possible in many other contexts. The
distributional question is not key. Any gain to the whole will maximize
the gain to each of the parts.
2. Fine Tuning the Structure
a. The Need for a Number
How then to maximize the whole? The first point is to note that we
speak here of a statute of limitations rather than a common-law rule.
The point is often obscured by the massive common law gloss upon the
basic statute. With adverse possession the requirements that possession
be actual, open, notorious, continuous, hostile and under color of title are
often read into statutes in order to flesh out their basic structure. That
process can hardly be avoided. For example, if possession is only inter-
mittent, it could be regarded as a simple trespass and not as a claim of
title by the intruder. Something like the "continuous" and "actual" re-
quirements are needed to determine whether the original owner is only
barred from claiming money damages for physical damage to property or
is also barred from claiming ownership of the property as such. Simi-
larly, where the claim of possession is in secret, it does not give the notice
of inconsistent use that should trigger a response by the original owner.
To focus upon the elements in litigation, however, is to ignore the un-
controversial, but critical, portions of the underlying statute. The major
reason why the law of adverse possession begins with a statute is that
common-law adjudication cannot generate the number needed to struc-
ture litigation. It may be able to develop, as did the courts of equity,
some principle of laches, whereby "unreasonable and unexcusable delay"
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https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol64/iss3/3
Number 3] THE TEMPORAL DIMENSION IN THE LAW OF PROPERTY 681
bars relief. Yet a number, not a principle, is far more likely to maximize
the social gain from this set of forced exchanges. The certainty provided
by a number increases the value generated by the statute and makes it
more likely that the deviation from the original baseline of corrective
justice (landowner always wins against wrongful intruder) will satisfy the
Pareto superior test.
Consider the alternative. What is the utility of a doctrine that assigns
a probability of success to the length of the interval between the last act
relevant to liability and the time of suit? No individual plaintiff or de-
fendant wants to be told that there is 0.60 chance of allowing the suit to
go forward if it is brought within 10 years of the date the cause of action
accrued, but only 0.25 chance of allowing it to proceed if it is brought
after 20 years. Sheer random chance makes everyone worse off in a
world of risk-averse persons, while it still permits a large number of suits
by plaintiffs who think the fractional gain is worth the expense of going
forward. A single number stated in advance truncates the risk of making
it clear that some actions cannot be brought. Randomness still remains
in the system for suits that do not run afoul of the limitation period, but
the level of error is clearly reduced. But it is necessary to remember that
too much of a good thing is a bad thing. Any effort to reduce random-
ness altogether runs into an opposite problem: A short limitations period
increases the likelihood of improper conduct by trespassers to begin with,
by reducing the likelihood of private correction action. To take an ex-
treme case, a statute of limitation of a single day is virtually tantamount
to abolishing the entire substantive law.
How then should statutes of limitations be designed to reconcile the
competing objectives? One critical element is the length of the basic pe-
riod of limitation. Here the general historical tendency has been to re-
duce the period of limitation. While periods of 20 years were once
commonplace, today one sees statutes in which the basic period is in the
range of six to ten years, the shorter number predominating when the
adverse possessor pays taxes.21 Overall, the long period in early times
was perhaps a result of high politics and of gaps in civil order that arose
from the forced absence of landowners from the land because of plague,
crusade or military service. Today the shorter period seems to make bet-
21. See, e.g.. I The Statute of 21 James I., ch. 16 (1623). which called for a 20-year limitation
period In New York for example, the limitation periods were reduced from 15 to 10 years in 1963.
Section 34 of the 1948 Civil Practice Act called for the 15-year period. The modern 10-year statute
i% now found in N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 212(a) (McKinney, 1972).
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ter sense because there are fewer obstacles to taking prompt action once
adverse possession occurs.
The arguments for short statutes of limitations gain some support
when one looks at the analogous problem of limitations in the context of
private contracts. Here the parallel is imperfect because the underlying
nature of the dispute, say a contract of employment or for the sale of
goods, is radically different from that involved in the typical title dispute.
Nonetheless, the parallel is instructive because it gives some clue as to
the consensual attitude toward the limitation problem. That evidence is
useful in light of the general admonition that rules regulating disputes
between strangers should, subject to limitations of knowledge and admin-
istration, imitate the rules which private parties fashion for themselves.
In practice, voluntary agreements tend (strongly, I should hazard) to
bring operative facts back to the present. In most voluntary agreements
these statutes tend to be shorter than those prescribed by law, a result
expressly contemplated by the Uniform Commercial Code.22 In addi-
tion, private contracts often adopt analogous rules, such as those gov-
erning the rejection of nonconforming goods, that function like statutes
of limitations, at least with regard to the use of certain remedies.23 To be
sure, there seem obvious reasons why the periods of limitation for real
estate should be longer: it is far harder for the absentee landowner to
discover the loss of rights than it is for a buyer to learn that he has re-
ceived nonconforming goods. Nonetheless, even after making appropri-
ate adjustments, the long limitation periods of ancient times appear to be
inappropriate today.
b. Tolling the Statute
Once the length of the statute is settled, the next question concerns the
exceptions to the general rule. One important statutory exception deals
with the disability of the party dispossessed: infancy and insanity at the
22. See U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (1983): "An action for breach of contract for sale must be com-
menced within four years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original agreement the par-
ties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year but may not extend it." The
language of the section suggests that reductions in statutory periods are more common than exten-
sions. Yet it is not clear why there is any restriction upon the parties' ability to vary the appropriate
limitation period by agreement.
23. The U.C.C. allows the buyer a reasonable period of time to reject goods not in accordance
with tender. That right of rejection may be more valuable than a right of action for the damages
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time of the adverse possession normally toll the running of the statutory
period. In one sense, the exception seems odd. By the normal views of
corrective justice, the private disabilities of one party are not individual
acts that alter the balance of entitlements between parties. It should not
matter whether the infant or insane person is the plaintiff or the defend-
ant. If an infant or an insane person takes actions that harm a stranger,
the proper view, I believe, is to hold the defendant responsible in tort to
the extent of his resources; an act of aggression should not be the occa-
sion to transfer resources from one private party to another. If the de-
fendant had inflicted harm upon himself, he could not demand aid from
the plaintiff. Why then should he be allowed to escape the consequences
of the harm so inflicted when it is imposed upon another?24 Status is not
conduct and the rights of action are not diminished solely because of the
age or mental condition of the plaintiff. Matters are far more complex
where the plaintiff's conduct is in issue, but even here there are many
contexts (e.g., driving) where the defendant's age or insanity should not
diminish the standard of conduct expected by a plaintiff, even though
there are others (e.g., infant trespassers) where some additional burdens
are imposed upon landowners.
Against that mixed background, it is instructive to ask, why the uni-
form recognition of disabilities in the context of adverse possession? The
conventional answer is that these exceptions are appropriate because the
party who labors under a disability is not in an effective position to vindi-
cate his rights by recourse to the legal system. There is obviously a great
fear of the victimization of those helpless to protect themselves. But
surely a complete account must contain more than this, for the question
still remains, how do we take into account the losses on the other side
that result from the tolling of the statute where the disabled party in fact
has an invalid claim? If the original justification for the statute of limita-
tions spoke in terms of Pareto superior moves from common-law rights,
the tolling exceptions should be justified by the same standard, as a fur-
ther step toward overall social gains.
It is, moreover, possible to find reasons for tolling that go beyond unre-
strained sympathy for the helpless plaintiff. One possible explanation
24. [There is] no more propriety or justice in making others bear the losses resulting from
his unreasoning fury when it is spent upon them or their property, than there would be in
calling upon them to pay the expense of his confinement in an asylum when his own estate
is ample for the purpose.
T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 100 (1868). For opposition to this position, see
O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 88-96 (1881).
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refines the earlier analysis of error costs. Suppose that the general
realiability of lawsuits diminishes over time. The question is whether the
subset of suits brought by infants and insane persons degenerates at the
same level as the usual class of cases. There is some reason to think that
it does not. In the ordinary case, the strong plaintiffs have an incentive
to bring their suits within proper time, which suggests that the residual
cases are apt to be weak. Where disabilities are present, that opportunity
for suit cannot be availed of. Accordingly, the pool of suits that remains
at the expiration of the original statutory period should be somewhat
better in quality than a group of suits randomly chosen. If so, then bar-
ring causes of action where these disabilities are present comes at a some-
what higher price, for now more meritorious claims will be prevented
here than in the broader class.
Yet, the argument cannot be taken too far. Infancy can last for eight-
een years. Insanity can last for a good deal longer than that. The domi-
nant view does not allow individuals to tack one disability upon
another--once the infant reaches 18 the period runs even if he becomes
insane at age 15-but it still tolerates very long periods of delay in com-
parison with the relatively short periods routinely allowed under the stat-
ute. One possible explanation is that such multiple hardships are not
foreseeable, but typically the possibility of their occurrence is easily fore-
seen even if their low probability is generally well known. In the end, the
better explanation comes from a different quarter. The passage of time in
dual disabilities cases so diminishes the quality of the pool that the lines
finally cross: there is no overall benefit to allowing these suits to con-
tinue. The prohibition against tacking one disability upon another is
thus a crude (and highly imperfect) surrogate for an absolute statute of
limitation.
The hard question thus raised is whether the simple passage of time at
some point becomes so powerful an obstacle to recovery that suits should
be barred notwithstanding the equitable considerations raised by the in-
fancy and the insanity disabilities. I believe that it should. The pool of
cases under disability may be somewhat better than those which are not.
But there is nothing in the argument given above that says that the differ-
ences in quality are apt to be very substantial. At that point, the most
that can be said is that the appropriate time for suit should be extended
slightly. The fundamental Pareto superior logic of the statute of limita-
tions does not demand that the single number provide the solution to all
problems. One approach is a short statute of limitations (e.g., six years),
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with tolling for disabilities. Married to that should be an outside period
of recovery which stipulates that all actions must be brought within, say,
15 years after they have accrued-period. There is no reason to use the
anti-tacking rule as a proxy when a better rule-a number-is available.
Nor is the cost of the absolute prohibition high in this context. The
number of suits involving disabilities is surprisingly small.25 It seems,
therefore, unwise to extend routinely the period of title examination long
enough to cover both the initial limitations period and the disability pe-
riod. The possibility that the plaintiff will never be in a position to bring
suit can be handled by the appointment of guardians (who may be
needed for other reasons) with the capacity to bring suit on behalf of the
infant before his maturity.26 True, this solution is itself imperfect be-
cause of possible conflicts of interest between principal and agent. But
the costs of indefinitely prolonging the time of suit seem even greater. A
rule that says "finis" seems to be an intelligent part of a two-tier scheme,
similar to that which distinguishes adverse possessors who pay taxes and
those who do not. A somewhat more complex "capital structure" is
needed here as well.
c. Subjective Intent
The two-tier statute could also be helpful in connection with another
important problem in the law of adverse possession, the treatment of sub-
jective intention of the adverse possessor. Under the standard view of
hornbook law, it is immaterial whether the adverse possessor has taken
property in good or bad faith, i.e., with knowledge that title to the prop-
erty rests in the hands of another.27 The case law, however, seems to tell
a different story. Richard Helmholz has persuasively documented the
proposition that judges and juries are far more hostile to parties who take
in bad faith and will often take steps to prevent the limitation period
from running.2" Often these steps are covert, as by reading the con-
tinuity requirement in a restrictive sense when the defendant is in bad
25. See Helmholz, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent, 61 WASH. U. L.Q. 331, 336 n.19
(1983).
26. The point was seen by Ballantine: "Friends or relatives or guardians will ordinarily protect
the rights of owners under disability, and individual cases of hardship would be more than balanced
by the greater security of all titles." Ballantine, supra note 17, at 145-46.
27. See, e.g., 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 15.2-15.4; RESTATEMENT SECOND OF PROP-
ERTY § 458 (1944); J. AMES, The Nature of Ownership in LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY AND
MISCELLANEOUS LEGAL ESSAYS, 192, 197-207 (1913).
28. See Helmholz, supra note 25, at 331.
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faith. This hostile treatment of bad faith possessors is troublesome be-
cause it raises the specter that the original owner has a perpetual right to
recover land that was originally taken in bad faith: in principle it is far
from clear how subsequent events can "cure" the total denial of the limi-
tation period created by the trespasser's original bad faith. Moreover,
the manifest inconvenience of that rule should be evident. As time passes
improvements are made, and property may be devised or sold to an inno-
cent purchaser. The case law offers very few explicit answers to the ques-
tion when the period starts to run, as most suits to recover real property
are brought against the original dispossessor. It may well be that any
voluntary transfer removes the bad faith taint that tolls the statute.29
Stated otherwise, the bad faith is regarded as personal to the original
dispossessor, but does not follow against subsequent takers in good
faith.30
The situation is in a sense parallel to the general refusal to tack disabil-
ity upon disability, and again it implicitly creasts a two-tier statute of
limitations. Allowing transfer inter vivos or by death to remove the bad
faith taint in effect creates de facto a longer limitation for bad faith tak-
ings It is important that this limitation not be tied to the usual rules
governing the bona fide purchaser for value because then the period itself
becomes very long, given the common practice of keeping land within the
family by essentially gratuitous transactions.
However this elusive line is to be drawn, the intuitive distinction be-
tween good and bad faith possessors is backed by powerful utilitarian
overtones. Parties who engage in deliberate wrongs constitute a greater
threat than those who make innocent errors or are simply negligent:
there is a greater danger that intentional wrongdoers will do it all again.
They are both bad people in the individual cases and a menace in the
future, so in this context the ideals of deterrence and retribution move
hand in hand.
In other contexts the legal system is replete with rules designed to re-
move legal protection from persons who act in bad faith, willfully harm-
ing the person or property of another. Parties who in bad faith cut
timber or mine coal from their neighbor's land must normally surrender
29. The point was not covered in the cases analyzed in Helmholz's article. In conversation,
Helmholz has suggested that any subsequent transfer (not just one to the bona fide purchaser) would
start the operation of the statute. Otherwise there could be no end to litigation.
30. Here again it seems that knowledge of the original defect in acquisition should not bar the
running of the statute, unless the transferee was part of the original scheme to take the property.
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the property without the offset for costs made available to the cutter or
miner acting in good faith. 31 The standard plans for automobile no-fault
insurance and workers' compensation generally prevent some classes of
deliberate wrongdoers from taking advantage of the limited liability that
the system affords in cases of accidents, whether or not attributable to
negligence.32 Similarly, noninvasive nuisances, e.g., spite fences, also
turn on the presence or absence of malice.33 In a different realm, the
grant of a qualified immunity for public officials leaves them exposed to
claims for decisions executed in bad faith.34
Even if bad faith cases are rightly distinguished from good faith cases,
there is still the matter of the payoff. The dominant practice identified by
Helmholz seems to imply that the bad faith possessor, and just possibly
his successor in title, never obtain clear title. But that conclusion does
not seem desirable, given uncertainties of litigation.35 As with the case of
disabilities, an explicit two-tier statute of limitations may be the appropri-
ate response. The good faith possessor may be able to claim the benefit of
a short period of limitation, while the bad faith possessor is subject to a
second, longer period of limitation. The costs of maintaining suit rise
with time, as does the likelihood that an innocent party will succeed to
the adverse possessor. The net benefits of allowing suit are not always
positive, even for bad faith takings; after all, statutes of limitations run
for intentional torts. If the optimal length of a statute of limitations for
the good faith possessor is, say, 6 or 10 years, then that for the bad faith
possessor might be 12 or 20 years. The special treatment of bad faith
possessors is still preserved, and the sanctions imposed against them can
31. See, eg., Maye v. Tappan, 23 Cal. 306 (1863); Phillips v. Homfray, 24 Ch. D 439 (1883).
For a discission, see generally Epstein, Inducement of Breach of Contract as a Problem of Ostensible
Ownership, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 2 (1987).
32. See, eg., Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 6 n.3, 271 N.E.2d 592, 597 n.3 (1971).
33. There is a distinction in that, with the spite fence cases, the malice renders actionable con-
duct that would not otherwise be actionable. With the bad faith possessor, no one denies the action-
ability of an entrance, even in good faith; the sole question is the duration of the statute of limitation.
34. Often the choice is between qualified and absolute immunity. One absolute immunity see
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982); Barrv. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959). For qualified immu-
nity, see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978). The
course of official immunities has been treacherous to say the least. Interestingly enough, no one
regards an immunity that covers only innocent or negligent actions worth having. See generally,
Symposium on Civil Liability of Government Officers: Property Rights and OfficialAccountability, 42
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1978); Cass, Damage Suits Against Public Officers, 129 U. PA. L. REV.
1110 (1981).
35. But see the discussion of slant drilling infra p. 689 where the statute seems to take the
categorical position, for reasons perhaps associated with the nature of the underlying asset.
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be strengthened by other devices: a different valuation for interim im-
provements, the payment of damages in addition to the surrender of the
land, or the possible exposure to fines or other criminal sanctions.
On balance, I believe that the two-tier statute of limitations is superior
to another alternative recently examined by Professor Merrill in his pa-
per, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Adverse Possession. 6 The gist of
Merrill's proposal is to apply the well known distinction between prop-
erty rules and liability rules of Calabresi and Melamed"7 to the adverse
possession area. In general, the property rule will provide the owner
with an injunction in a tort case or specific performance in a conveyance
case so that the party not in possession of the right must purchase it from
the owner. The liability rule in contrast allows the party, who does not
own the right, upon payment of damages, to leave the original owner at
least as well off as before. The Merrill proposal, based upon a recent
California case, Warsaw v. Chicago Metallic Ceilings, Inc.,"8 would pro-
tect good faith adverse possessors by a property rule. In its novel feature,
bad faith possessors would be protected only by a liability rule. Accord-
ingly, the bad faith possessor could either maintain a suit for quiet title or
resist a suit for recovery of the land by paying the true owner the market
value of the land, measured at the time of the dispossession. This rule
recognizes the important practical consequences that judges and juries
alike attach to the question of good and bad faith. The difficulties with
the rule, however, are more substantial because it does not contemplate
any specific statute of limitation for the bad faith case. Thus, the rule
raises the possibility that these suits, with their attendant valuation ques-
tions, may be brought for an indefinite period of time. It also raises the
possibility that the land will have to be returned if its value has declined
from the time of the original adverse possession. The alternative two-tier
limitation system recognizes the core of common sense in the good and
bad faith distinction. By so doing, the two-tier statute of limitations
tends to make it more difficult, but not impossible, for judges to distort
36. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Adverse Possession, 79 Nw. U.L. REv. 1122
(1984-85).
37. Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972).
38. 35 Cal. 3d 564, 676 P.2d 584, 199 Cal. Rptr. 773 (1984). The Supreme Court decision
relied upon the statutory language that provided "Occupancy for the period prescribed by the Code
of Civil Procedure as sufficient to bar any action for the recovery of property confers a title thereto,
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the other substantive requirements of adverse possession. By drawing
different statutes of limitations for the two kinds of cases, the two-tier
statute respects the basic intuition and promotes finality. Over the long
history of adverse possession, the doctrine has never required the adverse
possessor to pay for what has been taken after the statute of limitations
has run. On balance, there seems to be no good reason to alter that his-
torical judgment. Liability rules are costly to administer and undercut
the security of transactions concern that lies at the base of the rule.
Some evidence about the difficulty of the limitation question, more-
over, can be gleaned from statutes of limitations governing slant drilling
in oil and gas cases. 39 These statutes were passed by and for the benefit
of individuals who were in the same line of business. In general, the
commercial interests who secured their passage were as likely to be de-
fendants as plaintiffs in future cases. It is very difficult to find in these
statutes an implicit scheme to transfer income or property from one
group of owners to another. Rather, the close nature of the business
community that pushed the statutes through makes them look more like
contracts to clear up the condition of titles, which work for the long run
advantage of all interested parties. It is instructive, therefore, that the
statutes explicitly incorporated the distinction between good and bad
faith slant drilling and provided a short statute of limitations (180 days)
for good faith drilling that started running 10 days after the well was
placed into operation. The statutory treatment of bad faith drilling post-
poned the operation of the 180 day statute of limitations until the ag-
grieved party discovered the violation of his rights. That statute differs
from my proposed two-tier scheme in that it has no outside period for
undiscovered bad faith drilling that runs from the date of the offense.
This open-ended rule is somewhat puzzling, but it may be tied to the
possibility that most violations will be discovered in a relatively short
time because of the wasting nature of oil and gas resources, which are
quickly developed whenever there is a common pool problem. Whatever
the reason for that particular feature, the statute is singularly instructive
about the administerability and relevance of the line between good and
bad faith. The line seems coherent and makes sense.
d. Adverse Possession and Future Interests
There is one final situation in which a two-tier statute of limitations
39. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 349 3/4 (Deering Supp. 1986).
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might be appropriate. Under the standard hornbook doctrine, time be-
gins to run only when the party entitled to possession is able to bring suit
against the adverse possessor. Where the party dispossessed owns the fee
simple in possession, the right of action begins at the time of disposses-
sion. But where the land is subject to a future interest, the single dispos-
session gives rise to two distinct causes of action. The statute of
limitation begins to run against the tenant in possession at the time of
entry, but it normally will begin to run against the remainderman only
when he becomes entitled to possession, which could occur many years
after the original dispossession took place. This system could postpone
the perfection of title for a long time, for even if a ten year statute has run
against the life tenant, the entire statutory period will start anew at his
death, which might occur 40 years after the original dispossession.
The usual argument for allowing the remainderman to recover is said
to rest on fundamental fairness. The statute of limitation cannot run
before the right of action begins, for it is important to provide legal pro-
tection for those not in position to protect themselves. As stated, the
argument bears a close parallel to that invoked to toll the statute of limi-
tations for personal disabilities. But as with disabilities, more is at work;
for it is necessary to prevent a second type of error-groundless suits by
the remainderman and unfortunate impediments to the marketability of
title. The reopening of the statutory period for the benefit of the remain-
derman raises very high costs on these counts.
To understand the total picture, however, it is necessary to note that
the remainderman need not be wholly without protection even if the stat-
ute does not start anew at the termination of the life estate. The remain-
derman could be allowed a right of action even before he is entitled to
possession. The obvious analogy is to an action for waste, which the
remainderman can bring against a tenant in possession, even before his
own interest vests in possession. In principle, there is no reason why the
remainderman should not be allowed to sue a third party, even if the
tenant for life chooses not to protect his own interest. That offset, how-
ever, is far from perfect because in many instances the contingent re-
mainderman might not be identified. Even if he is, he may not be in a
position to learn of the adverse possession. Finally, the remainderman
might choose not to sue precisely because his benefit from suit is only
obtained upon the death of the tenant for life.
There is, of course, the possibility that the tenant for life and the re-
mainderman can bargain to allocate the costs of suit, but in many cases
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we can be confident that such a bargain will not be reached because the
transaction costs exceed the anticipated gains to the parties. Yet even so,
the remainderman is not without resources. To some degree he is able to
free-ride upon the interests of the life tenant, who in successfully com-
pleting suit, necessarily vindicates the interest of the remainderman as
well. The key question then is whether the life tenant will bring suit.
If there is some family connection between the tenant for life and the
remainderman, a common situation, then there is a far greater likelihood
that the tenant for life will regard restoration to the remainderman as
advancing in large measure his own interest. If so, the problem of creat-
ing proper incentives in the presence of public goods (here the external
benefit to the remainderman) is a large measure reduced.
Now suppose that there is no family connection between the tenant for
life and the remainderman. Whether suit will be brought will then turn
upon whether the anticipated expenses of the life tenant exceed the po-
tential recovery. Where the life tenant is young, he will enjoy the greater
portion of the estate, so that the incentive to sue will be high. The win-
dow of vulnerability--cases where the anticipated costs of suit lie be-
tween the value of recovery to the tenant and the total value of
recovery-will be narrow precisely because the value of the remainder
interest is low. With young life tenants, then, the public goods problem
is not apt to be severe.
Alternatively, with older life tenants, it is far more likely that the re-
mainderman will be identified and will have a substantial interest in
bringing suit. He might even take possession of the real estate within the
basic statutory period. While the life tenant may be less likely to sue, the
remainderman is more able and more likely to protect his own interest-
even within a short statutory period. In the end, therefore, the number
of cases that are apt to fall through the cracks, that is, those where
neither life tenant nor remainderman have sufficient incentive to sue, is
likely to be small. As with disabilities, the case of extending the limita-
tion period can be made; but again the proper solution seems to be a two-
tier statute with an absolute outer limit, which for the ease of conven-
ience should be set at the same point as that used in both disability and
bad faith cases.
3. An Ounce of Prevention
Thus far I have looked at the question of the limitation of actions from
the perspective of someone interested in remedies after the violation has
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occurred. In practice, this thinking has an archaic element. An optimal
system of remedies is one that makes two sets of comparisons. The first
comparison is between remedies ex post and remedies ex ante. The sec-
ond is between public and private remedies. On both these points, the
law of adverse possession has a distinctively obsolete caste. Modern in-
stitutional developments have tended to reduce the importance of this
entire body of law.
First, the frequency of adverse possession varies inversely with the ex-
penditures that the owner incurs in order to avoid that adverse posses-
sion. Today, effective avoidance measures are available at low cost.
Surveys have become cheaper and more reliable. More property is sold
by institutional developers who are able to generate the paperwork for
clear title to tract housing. Future interests in real property, and the
knotty adverse possession issues they create, are today avoided like the
plague. The increased use of trusts, often created by wills, reduces the
likelihood that any person will obtain legal title to property during mi-
nority. Within the modem environment the overwhelming practice is to
avoid the blunders in conveyancing and surveying that breed a large
number of adverse possession claims. There is an instructive parallel to
recordation systems generally, in which a system of clear title has elimi-
nated the endless permutations of actions and constructive notice that
arose under the earlier law.
Cleaning up the system in advance puts far less stress on the remedies
that are available after the fact. There are simply fewer cases of innocent
adverse possession for the remedial system to contend with. The bad
faith portion of the docket has shrunk as well. In the formative era of the
common law, the police were unknown; self-help and legal action were
the dominant modes of protection. The key objective of the ancient pro-
cedure was to delineate when self-help had to yield to legal suit, a period
of time which was set surprisingly short-Maitland says at four days.40
But the modem police force has changed all this. Dispossession is re-
garded as a criminal offense, and the public force is brought to bear long
before any limitation period could possibly take effect. The theoretical
analysis of adverse possession is not changed by these modem develop-
ments, but its practical importance surely is. The issue was once at the
heart of land law and practical politics. Today, as an issue primarily
concerned with boundary disputes and conveyancing errors, adverse pos-
40. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 5, at 50.
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session, as an institutional matter, is largely of a problem solved. In the
law of real property, the action has shifted to questions of conveyancing,
recordation, zoning and other land-use controls-problems themselves
unknown in the earlier era when the question of forcible adverse posses-
sion lay at the heart of the land law.
II. THE FUTURE
The second part of this essay on property law is directed toward time
and the future. Past and future are united in one sense and divided in
another. They are united because the further one moves away from the
present, the greater the uncertainty about what will happen, or has hap-
pened, and why. Yet, the past and the future are divided because time is
always moving away from the one and toward the other. Only on rare
occasions does the passage of time cure gaps in the available evidence
about the past. For the future, however, it is a routine practice (as with
rules of "wait-and-see") to allow matters to resolve themselves as subse-
quent events unfold.
This section asks how legal rules and institutions should be fashioned
to respond to the pervasive uncertainty about future events. The central
question in the inquiry is what limitations, if any, ought to be placed
upon the structure of ownership and the power of disposition over things
so owned. That question has especial relevance because of the permanent
nature of land, but it would be a mistake to think that the problem begins
and ends with land. Many forms of ownership, such as the corporation
and the trust, arise precisely because of the need to create fungible inter-
ests in what otherwise would be unique properties. The permanent na-
ture of the underlying assets, such as those found in trusts, corporations,
and condominiums, have important influence upon the governance struc-
tures needed for their sound operation. The problems initially con-
fronted with ownership of land have spread out far from their original
source.
This part of the essay addresses the question of time in three sections.
The first looks at the reasons, historical and analytical, why ownership in
fee simple, entailing absolute ownership rights of infinite duration, came
to dominate the law of real property. The second section discusses the
evolution of the fee simple from its feudal origins and examines the con-
sequences of divided interests in land in connection with the law of
waste, the rule against perpetuities, the rules on restraints of alienation,
and the trust. This section concludes that the various legal restraints
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upon the power of alienation should generally be abolished. Some of
these restrictions serve useful functions for the parties to the transaction,
while those which do not would ordinarily not be adopted by the grantor,
either in family or commercial situations, because either he or his grant-
ees would have to bear the lion's share of the cost. The third section
traces the gradual transition from grant to contract in the evolution of
joint ownership and finds that the same patterns emerge under trusts,
condominium associations or corporations. In this third section, two
themes emerge. First, here as elsewhere, freedom of contract turns out to
be the hidden thread that links together many disparate practices and
doctrines. Second, the governance structures chosen in these private ar-
rangements lend unsuspected support to our present constitutional ar-
rangements in the political sphere.
A. Absolute Ownership of Infinite Duration
The question, what restrictions should be imposed upon the rights of
private ownership, is perhaps as old as the law of property. Both in prin-
ciple and in practice, the question arises with the initial acquisition of
property. Here, however, theory has often been submerged in the politics
of feudalism, as royal claims prevented the emergence of ownership of
land by occupation.4" Nonetheless, the analytical structure of ownership
becomes clearer if viewed in light of the first possession rule applicable to
wild animals, or indeed the law of adverse possession, which operates as
a rule of first possession against all strangers to the original title.
More concretely, the first possession rule is relevant in two temporal
dimensions. The first section of this paper spoke of the priority of acqui-
sition. The subject of this section is the duration of the ownership inter-
est thus acquired. On this issue, the basic case yields results that
correspond with the dictates of good sense. Ownership acquired by first
possession is and should be of infinite duration. Only this rule creates a
complete set of definite property rights over all things. Any other regime
leaves unresolved the vital question who has obtained, or who can obtain,
ownership of the thing after the limited period obtained by first posses-
sion. Where ownership is not indefinite, the initial period could be mea-
sured either in lives or in years. The choice between these time periods
itself has important consequences, but the most critical objections apply
no matter how a limited interest is defined.
41. See supra note 13.
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Where original acquisition of land or chattels gives only a limited in-
terest, no satisfactory allocation of rights over the remainder is possible.
One possible solution upon termination of the present interest would be
to let the thing once owned revert into the common pool, where once
again it can be subject to acquisition by first possession. Alternatively,
the ownership of the property could revert to the state, best understood
as the group of all other people out of possession. (A one hundred per-
cent estate tax would do it.) The first alternative returns the thing to its
original unowned condition, while the second subjects it to collective
ownership of the public at large-the very result precluded by the basic
first possession rule.
While there are obvious differences between the two positions, both
leave unresolved two major problems. First, how will the owner of the
limited interest behave in order to minimize his losses at the expiration of
the term, be it for years or for life? Second, how will gains from the
unowned or publicly owned property be divided among the citizens of
the state once it passes into public control?
On the first question, any owner will be more reluctant to invest in
long-term improvements when his interest has a limited time horizon.
As a matter of theory, the limited interest in property necessarily entails
that the party who sows (all) cannot reap (all). The partial mismatch
between investment and reward creates an external benefit for the (un-
identified) remainderman, and in turn sets up a serious conflict of interest
problem for the tenant in possession, not dissimilar to that which arises
when the adverse possessor enters land occupied by a tenant for life.
This mismatch will not curb all investment, but it will reduce investment
levels until at the margin, the expected private returns equal the expected
private costs. Inasmuch as the present owner is unable to capture in-
come after the expiration of his interest, he will quit investing too soon.
In principle that resulting externality could be overcome by a bargain
between the tenant in possession and the parties entitled to the subse-
quent ownership interest. But how can those bargains take place if the
tenant in possession does not know with whom to bargain, or if there are
too many potential remaindermen to bargain with?
The difficulties with limited interests are frequently encountered in
routine real estate practice. Yet, here it is possible to anticipate them by
contract if the original fee was vested in a single owner. For example,
lessees contemplating major improvements typically negotiate with the
landlord in advance in order to insure that the lease can be renewed dur-
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ing the anticipated life of the improvement; or that some compensation
will be provided in the event that it is not. It simply is too risky to erect
the improvement and then hope for the best. Even where the tenant's
improvement is of no value to the landlord, there is still the risk of a
landlord's holdout at renewal time if that improvement has value to the
tenant. Some agreement ex ante, even one implicit and informal, goes a
long way to reduce the risk.4 2
Second, the indefinite rights at the expiration of the original limited
interest set up a destructive competition for the remainder interest.
Where property reverts back to its unowned status, there will be a race to
see who can acquire it first. The heirs (or other potential devisees) of the
prior owner may often have the inside track; nonetheless, others may be
able to win the race. The children of the decedent may still be infants, or
out of the country, or otherwise disabled. Yet even if their heirs are suc-
cessful, the original uncertainty in the outcome will feed back into earlier
decisions on investment and utilization: the temporal externality will be
diminished, but only by the probability that the desired successors of the
present occupant will become the new first possessors.
Alternatively, if property reverts to the government when the present
interest expires, then government will have to maintain or sell property,
or both, on a massive scale. These transactions in kind are always sub-
ject to various forms of intrigue and abuse not present when taxes are
collected in cash.43 These problems will only be exacerbated if tax sales
must be made on a routine basis, instead of being reserved only for the
occasional case of taxpayer default. In certain cases (i.e., with the acqui-
sition of historical sites, mineral tracts, scenic areas) there will be major
political disputes over whether government sale is preferable to govern-
ment management of retained property. These administrative costs seem
far greater than those in a system of private dispositions.
These issues help account for the strength of private inheritance that
42. The same uneasiness over limited interests arises where the government condemns a re-
mainder interest in real property while leaving the present landowners in possession under a term of
years, as has happened at the Beverly Shores National Park in Northern Indiana. By condemning
the future interest over the term, the government has induced individual landowners to skew their
investment decisions so that any future improvements are built to become worthless at the expiration
of the term, no mean feat given the lumpiness of investment, both in the construction of new and the
repair of old housing. New construction in the area is made of materials that are not expected to
out-last (at least by very long) present interest.
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allows the owner of property unfettered discretion in choosing his succes-
sor in title:' A definite system of property rights is preserved across gen-
erations. Allowing the present owner to choose the persons who enjoy
the property after death reduces the likelihood of wasteful subterfuges
designed to minimize the impact of the tax, or for a pattern of immediate
consumption, which may be easily approximated by the sale of fixed as-
sets and the purchase of a lifetime annuity.45 It also cuts down on the
premature or hidden transfers of assets to children or other family mem-
bers. With a strong bequest motive, the benefits to the next generation
will be treated largely as though they were benefits to present owners,
thereby reducing the dislocations that time may impose upon consump-
tion and investment preferences.46
This system of rights does not work effortlessly. Recently, James
Buchanan has argued that any system of ownership that provided for
rights of disposition at death could generate a cycle of wasteful rent-seek-
ing behavior as members of the next generation compete by trying to
curry favor with the present owner.47  Ideally, rent-seeking is avoided
because the owner demands something in exchange for the property sur-
rendered. The prospective owner therefore engages in the transfer and
not the dissipation of assets. Yet no return transfer can be made to a
decedent. There is accordingly some lack of the market discipline that
obtains in ordinary commercial transactions, because the risk increases
that potential beneficiaries will engage in nonproductive activities in or-
der to obtain control over desired assets.
Yet, in light of the alternatives it is dangerous to treat a problem as
necessarily calling out for a regulatory cure. The state could limit the
scope of discretion in the disposition of property at death, either by a rule
44. The emphasis in the text is on voluntary disposition at death. It is of course possible to
have systems whereby the property remains in the family to discharge, as it were, support obligations
to both spouse and (minor) children that survive death itself. Whether these obligations are imposed
is a close question, but it is not critical for our purposes. The gulf between the obligations and
desires of testators are, as a general matter, too small to generate any systematic distortions, the not
infrequent horror stories to the contrary.
45. See Tullock, Inheritance Justified, 14 J. L. & ECON. 465, 471 (1971).
46. The estate tax of course brings money into the public realm at death. Here the objection to
it cannot be based upon the ground that the state has no claim to private resources, but on the
ground that the proportionate income tax generates all the wealth that is needed to run the state
without creating the opportunities for factional behavior. For my views, see generally EPSTEIN,
TAKINGS, supra note 3, at ch. 18.
47. Buchanan, Rent Seeking, Noncompensated Transfers, and Laws of Succession, 26 J. L. &
ECON. 71 (1983).
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that fixes the pattern of succession within the family, or by the compre-
hensive tax payable directly to the government. Yet, these alternatives
appear, if anything, to be costlier than the problem they seek to obviate.
An owner aware of competition for his property can take effective steps
to avoid it by making clear (especially to his children) what kinds of
behavior are regarded as acceptable. Similarly, the owner can limit his
own power of disposition by contract or the creation of irrevocable
trusts. One common form of trust gives the settlor power to invade the
corpus, while leaving the residue to a favorite charity, including a foun-
dation which is especially set up to honor the decedent. On the other
hand, if dispositions take place within the family, the levels of competi-
tion are likely to be reduced because the natural love and affection be-
tween family members moderate the conflict that could be expected in
struggles between strangers. A simple rule of thumb that calls for equal
portions for all children goes a long way in that direction. Any scheme
of direct regulation may well lock an owner into a pattern of disposition
that he finds unpleasant, as with the parent who cannot discipline or
control a wayward child secure in an inheritance.4" Similarly, any re-
striction on disposition at death severely limits the power of owners to
make contracts, including implicit contracts, that do generate an imme-
diate benefit for the owner (say, care and companionship) in exchange for
payment or performance after death. No legal system can eliminate the
need for discretion; it can only locate it in the places where it is apt to be
exercised most effectively. In general, that place is in private hands.
The attack against absolute ownership is not only based upon a con-
cern for dynamics of wealth disposition within the family. In part, the
criticism derives from an extensive social concern with inter-generational
fairness, where it has two dimensions. The first arises from the fact that
no future person can own property today. The second derives from a
concern with income redistribution,49 which taken in its extreme form
holds that the initial financial endowments of any individual should not
48. The dynamic is important in family trusts. If the grandparents set up trusts that give the
grandchildren vested rights in substantial sums of wealth, the parents are often uneasy because the
financial independence undermines their control. Making social judgments about the situation is
very hard because there is no reason to assume that the parents have better judgment on these
matters than the grandparents.
49. A fuller exploration of these themes goes far beyond the scope of this paper. I have ad-
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depend upon the wealth of his parents.50 Often these concerns are of-
fered as reasons to limit the rights of present owners to dispose of prop-
erty as they will."' But the concern is misplaced. Even if members of the
present generation have absolute control over their own material wealth,
they cannot deny to members of the next generation their right to their
own labor-rights that will be worth more to them in an open and pros-
perous society. Efforts at confiscation are likely to produce defensive
measures that will dissipate the overall stock of wealth, and short of a
violent disruption of the family, they cannot reach the wide range of im-
plicit and explicit transfers that take place when children live in the fam-
ily household. Far from taking coercive steps to promote a set of equal
economic endowments for the unborn, the better strategy is to develop
institutional arrangements that insure that all members of the next gener-
ation will be able to develop their own talents without having to pay (say,
in the form of higher taxes) for the extravagances of the previous one,
and without being subject to various restrictions (e.g., the minimum
wage) that work to entrench the established interests.
In addition, future generations can be protected by voluntary private
arrangements as well as by public ones. Economic interests behind trusts
are often created for the next generation at least, usually with some safe-
guards to preserve the corpus. Many of these limitations take place
within the family, but many are for the benefit of the public at large.
Private charities and bequests are frequently made for educational and
medical purposes. In contrast, public ownership tends to lead to the
premature dissipation of wealth, not to its preservation, as its political
managers receive little direct benefit from improvements that yield their
greatest benefits after they are no longer able to hold public office. A
system that honors private dispositions in life and at death creates the
rights structure best able to counter the frictions and discontinuities that
impede the transfer and creation of wealth.
B. Common-law Ownership
L Title by Grant, not Possession: The Evolution of the Fee Simple
The argument just made addresses the temporal dimension of owner-
50. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE LIBERAL STATE 202 (1980).
51. See, e.g., J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 131 (1971): "Being unconditional, [first princi-
ples] always hold (under circumstances of justice), and the knowledge of them must be open to
individuals in any generation." For a concrete legal application see Sterk, Freedom from Freedom of
Contract: The Enduring Value of Servitude Restrictions, 70 IOWA L. REV. 615, 635 (1985).
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ship under the common-law doctrine of first possession. The historical
account is quite different from the analytical one because of the intimate
connection between private ownership and the medieval feudal institu-
tions. That story has been told many times and well.52 My purpose here
is only to select those portions of the tale that show the tension between
history and theory.
Historically, claims of first possession took a back seat to claims of
royal power. Individuals acquired all claims to land by grant. The first
link in the chain of grant was always the Crown, but in practice many
individuals in possession claimed through a succession of grants, each
made by intermediate parties otherwise entitled to possession. In the feu-
dal system, only the Crown claimed title outside the chain of grants. In a
sense, royal title was the ultimate form of adverse possession, that is title
by conquest, which any subject could challenge on the strength of his
prior possession only at his peril.
Feudalism, therefore, shifted the origin of title to real property from
possession to grant.5 3 These grants in turn were subject to infinite varia-
tion that would not have been possible with land acquired by first posses-
sion. To be sure, these grants could have taken the form of out-and-out
conveyances in which the entire interest of the grantor vested in the
grantee. Where both grantor and grantee are private parties, outright
conveyances are commonplace. The use of retained interests, which are
expensive to monitor and protect, is reserved commonly for special situa-
tions in which buyer and seller (or landlord and tenant) have common
interests in the same property, or where the grantor retains an interest in
some adjacent or nearby property. But where the grantor is the sover-
eign, the out-and-out conveyance is something of a legal impossibility
given the residual powers of taxation and eminent domain. More to the
point, the terms of the early grants were expressly limited and condi-
52. See, e.g., 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 5, at ch. 1; A. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE
LAND LAW, ch. 1 (2d ed. 1986).
53. Even here the power of the prior possession principle asserted itself historically. In the
period between 1278 and 1294, Edward I conducted his Quo Warranto campaign, in which he called
upon various holders of franchises to show the Royal grant from which their titles proceeded. As a
matter of general theory , the maxim nullum tempus occurrit regi, (no time runs against tile Crown)
appeared to preclude the use of any statute of limitations to protect franchises that had been held
"time out of mind." Nonetheless, the need for stability was so insistent that a 1290 statute recog-
nized prescription in this class of cases, so great was the potential disruption if long tenure was not
considered a sufficient warrant of franchises. See generally SUTHERLAND, QUO WARRANTO PRO-
CEEDINGS IN THE REIGN OF EDWARD 1-1278-1294, ch. 4 (1963). My thanks to Richard Helmholz
for suggesting the point.
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tional upon the obligation to provide military aid or other assistance to
the Crown. 4 The contract was in large measure an exchange of a limited
interest in land for personal services. Today, employment contracts end
with the death of the employee; and things were not much different in the
feudal world. Hence, the life estate for the loyal knight was, most proba-
bly, the original measure of ownership." Over time the nature of the
bargain between Crown and vassal changed. As military obligations
were commuted to cash payment, the obligations between Crown and
lord became less personal, and consequently of longer duration and less
variety.
The modem fee simple was built up by degrees as the older limitations
contained in the earlier grants passed by the wayside, first by royal grace,
then by custom, and then by legal right.56 The transitions are captured
in the development of the form of the standard grant. The simplest
grant, "to A," contains an ambiguity as to whether it conveys what we
should call the life estate or the fee simple. One way to show that the
estate survived the original grantee was to specify that the property was
transferred for the benefit of his heirs as well. Hence, the common form
of the grant, "to A and his heirs." Originally, the limitation to the heirs
was probably inserted as a compromise position. If absolute ownership
were given to the vassal in so many words, then the king ran a risk that
all promisees of services dread: the delegation of duties to strangers hos-
tile to the interest of the Crown. Yet, to make the contract only for life
left the vassal's family in a precarious state. Some protection for the
heirs (who generally would follow their father to inclinations) might have
been a good compromise solution, much as modem limited partnership
agreements typically allow free transferability of interests within the fam-
ily, but not to strangers.
The common form of the grant "to A and his heirs" reflected the un-
derlying tensions in the situation, which as a matter of construction it did
not obviously resolve. In one sense, this limitation could be read as a
joint gift to A and to some other persons, here collectively described as
his heirs. But the phrase "and his heirs" is not just like the phrase "and
54. Maitland gives an exhaustive and masterly account of the different forms of tenure, see 1 F.
Pol ocK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 229-406 (1968).
55. "Life tenancies which arose through express grant have a rather obscure early history,
which is bound up with the whole question of the development of the fee from something like a life
interest into a heritable interest." A. SIMPSON, supra note 52, at 70.
56, Id. at 48.
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B." B designates or names a particular person, but as the maxim "no
living person has an heir" reveals, the phrase "and his heirs" does not
refer to any individual or designated class of persons so long as A is still
alive. Instead, it gives a rule of decision that permits designation of the
takers of property at A's death on the strength of information available at
the time-another instance of wait and see.
One possible interpretation of the phrase "and his heirs" would have
created the first strict settlement in land. 7 A could alienate only his life
estate; each heir in turn would also have only a life estate to alienate; and
so the progression could continue in perpetuity. The ingenious distinc-
tion between words of "purchase"-stating who takes under the grant-
and words of "limitation"-stating what interest in land was taken-
took hold to avoid just this result.5 8 The phrase "and his heirs" was
construed to define the nature of the estate in A, and not to confer any
independent interest upon his heirs. This rendition destroyed the first
strict settlement and moved in the direction of the modem form of abso-
lute ownership, the fee simple. Where A conveyed the land, his heirs had
to look to A (who had received the proceeds) to provide for them (nor-
mally a good assumption). They could not challenge the title of his
grantee in the way that a surviving widow could claim dower rights if she
had not joined in the original conveyance, or the surviving widower
could claim courtesy. 9
This one constructional ploy did not of itself establish the absolute
nature of the fee ownership. There was still the question of what estate
the transferee took from A. When A (and his heirs) transferred the land
to B (and his heirs), what was the duration of B's estate? After some
hesitation, the medieval courts held that the line of descent no longer was
measured with reference to A, but traveled on to B.60 In strict principle,
57. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
58. A. SIMPSON, supra note 52, at 52. The distinction was well settled by Bracton's time.
Simpson thus quotes Bracton as saying "the heir acquires nothing from the gift made to his ancestor
because he was not enfeoffed with the donee." The thought is that a completed grant requires an
explicit acceptance by livery of seisin, which the heir, who is unidentified (or even unborn) cannot
perform.
59. A. SIMPSON, supra note 52, at 51-52.
60.
Strictly, if land were given "to A and his heirs," the fee simple should have determined as
soon as A and all his heirs were dead, even if A had alienated the land. But a fee simple
became potentially eternal when the courts decided that if a fee simple was alienated it
continued to exist so long as there was no failure of heirs of the owner for the time being.
R. MEGARRY & H. WADE, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 69 (4th ed. 1975) (citing Y.B. 33-35
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this devolution appears to violate the rule nemo dat quod non habet, (no
one may convey what he does not own) that normally guarantees that the
grantee's interest could not rise above the grantor's. If A died without
heirs, all should revert to the Crown.61 But the formal objection, if
pressed at all, did not survive, so that repeated application of the princi-
ple (as when B sold to C) guaranteed that the fee could last forever, no
matter what happened to A's line. The institution of outright ownership
thus emerged from the linguistic ambiguities of the standard grants.
2. Conflicts over Alienation of Fee
The rise of the fee simple from the ashes of feudalism represents only
the first chapter in the ceaseless elaboration of the English law of estates.
With some exaggeration, it is said that the evolution of the doctrine of
land law was driven by the conflict of interests between those who sought
to tie up land indefinitely and their successors in title who tried to defeat
these limitations. The history of the entail, of the destructibility of con-
tingent remainders, of the unbarrable executory limitation, of the rule
against perpetuities, and of the rule limiting restraints upon alienation all
reflect the same basic tension.
Yet, there is a puzzle here in identifying the social source of the prob-
lem. With the decline of feudalism, the conveyance of land ceased to be
connected intimately with the defense of the realm, and thus with the
grantee's provision of services. The standard transaction increasingly
took on the character of private law. Almost without exception, the cre-
ation of limited interests in land was done by private parties entering into
voluntary transactions with other private parties. Typically A, an owner
in fee simple, created by grant (and in later times by will) a limitation on
the fee simple that denied absolute ownership of the fee to the next party
in possession.
Conceptually, it has often been asserted that the difference in position
between the two parties to the grant raises problems of intergenerational
equity that call into question the original conveyance. A.W.B. Simpson
voices the concern:
Edw. I R.S. 362 (1306)). See also 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 106-07
(1923).
61. The situation is something of a puzzle, for in principle no one ever runs out of collateral
heirs. Yet in practice, the problem could arise if any rule limited the number of generations you
could go back to locate the collateral heirs, if only for reasons of imperfect record keeping. The rule
allowed B to start anew with his own line, creating the fee simple in perpetuity.
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The term "perpetuity" has been applied at various times in the history of
the law to refer to various arrangements by conveyancers to enable land-
owners to restrict the power of free alienation of land, by imposing upon
that land forms of settlement which made it impossible for their successors
in title (usually their children) to deal with it as freely as they themselves
had been able to do. Such attempts can be viewed as an abuse of the power
of free alienation, for a settlor who makes such an attempt is using the
freedom which the law gives him to deprive others of the same freedom; in
consequence at most periods of English legal history the courts have set
limits upon the degree to which landowners should be permitted to impose
such restrictions.62
The modem justifications for the rule against perpetuities echo the
same concern. Simes and Smith note that today the rule applies largely
to interests behind the trust and rarely to specific assets. 3 Yet even with
the trust, they defend the rule on the ground that
•.. it strikes a fair balance between the satisfaction of the wishes of the
members of the present generation to tie up their property and those of
future generations to do the same. The desire of property owners to convey
or devise what they have by the use of trusts and future interests is wide-
spread, and the law gives some scope to that almost universal want. But if
it were permitted without limit, then members of future generations would
receive the property already tied up by future interests and trusts, and could
not give effect to their desires for the disposition of property. 64
The insistence of perfect parity across the generations is no more per-
suasive here than it is with general attacks on private rights of disposition
at death.65 In the first place, any ability to create limited interests in
lands violates the condition of parity: e.g., the grant of a life estate in the
children with a vested remainder in the grandchildren. Yet from the ear-
liest times, limitations in this form were recognized by the courts,66 as
they had to be if any freedom of disposition was to be preserved.
In addition, it is hard to understand how the parity of control should,
or could, be created. The grantor owns the property outright and could
have consumed it completely. When he does, there is no parity at all;
62. A. SIMPSON, supra note 52, at 208.
63. See L. SiMEs & A. SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS § 1117 (2d ed. 1956). The transition be-
tween rules for specific assets and for pools of wealth is discussed infra at text accompanying notes
92-96.
64. Id.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 49-52.
66. See infra notes 76-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of the law of waste, another
body of law that illustrates a necessary asymmetry between the present and future.
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there is not even a second owner. When the grant is made subject to
condition, the grantee can either refuse to accept the limitation, or take it
for what it is. We do not deal here with the control by a constitutional
sovereign with limited powers which render certain types of grants be-
yond its power. Instead, we deal with an absolute owner for whom the
syllogism-"If I needn't convey at all, than I can convey subject to
whatever restrictions I choose"-seems to apply. If the grantee does not
like the restrictions, there is an easy out: he can reject the gift and ac-
quire his own property by purchase and thus obtain absolute control over
it.
More generally, the only justification for restraints of private aliena-
tion is to prevent the infliction of external harms, either through aggres-
sion or the depletion of common-pool resources.67 Thus, it might be
appropriate to restrict the sale of guns in order to make sure that they do
not get into the hands of persons who will kill with them, or to restrict
the sale of riparian rights (as by tying them to the sale of riparian lands)
to insure that no single riparian is able to take a disproportionate amount
of water from a river.68 Yet, these troublesome situations are far re-
moved from the restraints on alienation on the ordinary disposition of
land. The rule against perpetuities and its kindred rules are not directed
toward any kind of externality. Quite to the contrary, a single person
owns the entire interest in land before the disposition is made, ruling out
the possibility that adverse external effects will be created by the grant.69
The present owner can so tailor the terms of his grant to mediate in
advance the potential conflicts amongst the subsequent grantees. His
common grantees are in functional privity with each other because they
are in actual privity with the grantor. The situation thus seems inappro-
priate for direct public regulation.
At this point, however, the historical record is clouded. It does seem
clear that the catalogue of permissible common-law estates was some-
what limited, as the rules of "property" prevented the creation of any
estate that suited the whims and fancy of the grantor.7" Yet, historical
67. See generally, Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 970 (1985).
68 Discussed id. at 973-82.
69. Note that the Buchanan argument applied in principle only to dispositions at death, but the
rule against perpetuities applies to both inter vivos and post mortem transfers. As the two are close
substitutes, it is difficult to have one legal regime for the one, and a second for the other.
70. See generally Chudleigh's Case, I Rev. Rep. 113b (1595). Note that one could not create an
estate to A for Monday, B for Tuesday, etc. within the common law system. Special statutes were
then required to legitimate time-sharing arrangements that are so popular in some resort communi-
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knowledge is far less complete when it is no longer concerned with the
legal doctrines limiting strict settlements and addresses instead the prac-
tical importance of those restrictions. Thus, we have some tolerable
knowledge about the course of events that led to the barrable entail.7 t
But the critical question is, how often did landowners decide to create
multiple interests in land? And, what were their motivations? Obvi-
ously, the decided cases provide no fair sample of the standard practices
because they exclude all cases in which the fee simple passes between the
generations. Even when the original grantor placed limitations upon the
tenant in possession, these must be understood in context of other provi-
sions of the grant. It makes, for example, a great deal of difference
whether the tenant in possession was deprived of all powers of dealing
with the land, or whether, notwithstanding an entail, there was express
powers that enabled useful cultivation of the land-borrowing money se-
cured on the fee for long term improvements is one example.
At this point the puzzle deepens. It takes no great insight to realize
that multiple interests in real estate often reduce the economic marketa-
bility of title, for reasons that have long been understood. 72 The exist-
ence of any future interests raises the specter of the standard bilateral
monopoly problem between the life tenant in possession and the assorted
remaindermen. When there are only two players, a life tenant and a
single remainderman, any contract for sale to a third party requires the
original two parties to agree on two key terms of the contract: (a) the
price, and (b) the division of the proceeds. Agreement on the former is
hard enough where unique assets are in issue, for the component of sub-
jective value can be quite large. The second problem is, if anything, more
difficult. The tenant for life and the remainderman are not joint tenants
standing in roughly identical positions, where many problems can be ob-
viated by an even split of the proceeds.73 Instead, their positions are
ties, when grants of this form came to have a business purpose. See, eg., FLA, STAT. ANN. § 721.01
(West 1981).
71. See A. SIMPSON, supra note 52, at 126-37.
72. For a vivid and accurate account, see A. GULLIVER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW
OF FUTURE INTERESTS 16-21 (1959), where the imaginary dialogue between the life tenant in pos-
session, two contingent remaindermen and the reversioner illustrate all the concerns with setting
price and dividing shares, when the original positions are asymmetrical. See also L. SIMES & A.
SMrrH, supra note 61, at § 1117.
73. Even here complications can arise, as when one party has made improvements or repairs at
his own expense, or has used personal funds to pay off a mortgage on the property. It is often
possible to control the scope of strategic bargaining by rules that give credits for additional expendi-
tures, for example. But these devices are not available when there is no symmetry to begin with.
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asymmetrical. The parties may disagree both about the expected life of
the tenant for life and the appropriate discount rate by which to evaluate
the remainder. Matters only become more complex when the number of
parties to the transactions increase, as can happen when successive life
estates and remainder interests have been created under the original in-
strument. These problems are still more acute when the property in
question is left to persons who are unborn, and hence unable to contract,
or to living persons whose interests are contingent upon the occurrence
or nonoccurrence of some event.71 It is not clear therefore why any per-
son should voluntarily court these problems by trying to complicate the
state of the title. Business transactions will rarely take this form, as the
price paid the owner will be reduced to reflect the uncertainty of the title.
It is more difficult to make confident statements about gratuitous trans-
actions, whether by deed or by will, for the grantor (not to mention the
testator) typically receives only intangible and indirect compensation for
the transfer. But, if the value of the whole is reduced, then the family or
bequest objective of the grantor will be frustrated as well. There is good
reason, therefore, to think that divided interests in real estate do not
make a whole lot of sense in the routine case, a subject to which I shall
return in discussing the trust.
75
3. The Law of Waste
The most concrete manifestation of the problems created by divided
interests is reflected in the law of waste. Many management problems
occur during the period in which the fee simple is divided between pres-
ent and future interests. The law of waste76 is designed primarily to po-
lice the temporal boundary between the life tenant and the
remainderman. It begins with the assumption (to be examined presently)
that the division between two legal interests in the same land is as rigid as
the boundary line that separates two neighbors. For example, where
standing timber is found on land, then its complete harvest by the life
tenant implicitly transfers wealth from the remainderman (who had a
fraction of the value of the land) to the life tenant (who keeps all the
74. The original common law was reluctant to recognize contingent remainders. The early
cases recognized them only for heirs of a living person, so long as the remainder vested in interest
before the determination of the prior estate. Later on, the rule was generalized to allow any form of
condition, so long as vesting took place during the prior limited freehold condition. See A. SIMPSON,
supra note 52, at 212-13.
75. See infra pp. 714-16.
76. For a summary see R. MEGARRY & H. WADE, supra note 60, at 104-10.
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money) unless some steps are taken to insure that the proceeds of sale are
invested for the benefit of both life tenant and remainderman. Putting
the money into trust will do, although the choice of investment will influ-
ence the rate of return and hence the relative values of the life estate and
remainder interests.
As is often the case with residential properties, difficult problems occur
when life tenant and remainderman have honest differences in subjective
values. The life tenant may prefer to turn a forest into a farm, or a farm
into a factory; the remainderman may prefer to keep everything as it is. 7 7
The conflict between the two could be intractable, for actions which in-
crease the market value of the fee may diminish its subjective value to the
remainderman. Indeed, even if the remainderman wants either the farm
in the first case, or the factory in the second, he has a (slight) temptation
to dissemble, in hopes of extracting a cash payment as a precondition for
allowing the life tenant to go through with the deal. 78 These conflicts
may be reduced if the life tenant and remainderman are related by blood
or marriage, but family ties, especially amongst adult siblings, can be
eroded by honest differences in taste or changes in life style or
circumstance.
It would, however, be a mistake to conclude that direct public regula-
tion, such as that found in the law of entails and perpetuities, is necessary
to guard against the possibility of abuse. Two preliminary inquiries must
be addressed before reaching that conclusion. The first concerns a basic
misconception as to the source of the problem. As stated thus far, the
difficulties addressed by the law of waste appear to be inherent in the task
of policing the natural temporal boundary between life estate and re-
mainder. But there is no such natural boundary. The law of waste
should be understood, not as part of some fixed law of property, but as
part of the law of contract. The law of waste functions as a default provi-
sion that regulates the relationship of two interests in the absence of ex-
plicit grant provisions. A more elaborate grant, such as one that
provides a life estate, "with permission to open mines," or "permission to
harvest timber," or, most generally "without impeachment for waste,"
can take some sticks out of the remainderman's "natural" bundle of
rights and transfer them to the life tenant. When the grant is allowed to
77. See, e.g., Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 104 Wis. 7, 79 N.W. 738 (1899).
78. The matter is far more acute in other contexts. For example, there are stories of tenants
offering to pay money to break long-term leases just before they receive notice that the landlord is
prepared to buy out the term of years in order to raze the building.
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supplement the definition of the various estates, the catalogue of interests
in land is far richer than a simple compilation of the classical estates
might suggest. More specifically, the explicit language in the original
grant can obviate most potential bargaining problems between co-grant-
ees before they arise. A single grantor forms the hub from which the
diverse divided interests radiate.
On this view, the proper criticism of the law of waste is that it sets the
wrong initial default provision by providing too much protection for the
remainderman. One branch of this criticism is that many of the default
restrictions reduce the total value of the fee, as seems likely with the
common law prohibition against opening new mines without explicit au-
thorization in the grant.7 9 Mines are worth opening, but the likelihood
of that happening is reduced by the remainderman's holdout power. The
problem can be especially irksome where the life tenant is young so that
the slender interest of the remainderman can impose long delays on
production.
The second objection to the usual presumption is that it tended to
work against the distributive ends of the grantor, who normally wants to
favor the life tenant, especially if it is himself or a surviving spouse.
Modem trusts, which have to face similar allocation questions for intan-
gible wealth, make the point very clearly. The life tenant, usually a sur-
viving spouse, routinely receives the power to invade corpus. The
remainderman (to my knowledge) rarely if every receives the power to
invade the corpus without the consent of the tenant for life. The arrange-
ment makes perfectly good sense if the remaindermen are in the prime of
life, while the life tenant is at or near retirement age.
The comparison to the trust suggests a final twist in the tale. Why
would anyone choose to create legal remainders in land even if granted
the unquestioned power to do so? In principle, the transferor would have
to be able to identify enormous distributional gains from this legal ar-
rangement sufficient to overcome their enormous costs. Historically, it
seems hard to know what these gains might have been-hence my skepti-
cism about the practical importance of the entail and strict settlement. It
is said that the Englishman had particular attraction to the grand estate
and wanted to insure that it would remain in the family for many genera-
tions. But the decision to divide the land into various estates also worked
79 See R. MEGARRY & H. WADE, supra note 60, at 109: "for to open and work an unopened
mine is voluntary waste." Voluntary waste itself was defined as "the doing of that which ought not to
be done." Id. at 105, which, while restrictive, is not illuminating.
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to the obvious disadvantage of the immediate family. These complex
limitations might have been motivated by vanity or aspirations for gran-
deur, 0 but the typical family settlement does not stipulate that an estate
be drained to purchase a monument for the grantor. Rather, it protects
the surviving spouse and children, especially if minors, and perhaps the
grandchildren. Within the immediate family, the real reason for volun-
tary restrictions on alienation may have been to ensure that incompetents
in the next generation did not dissipate the fruits of their parents' labors.
But with the passage of time, the original guesses of wise parents became
ever more unreliable. The dead hand only works through a live agent, so
the trust, which allows a mixture of fixed direction and subsequent dis-
cretion, became the instrument of choice for curbing the excesses of the
young or the imprudent. There is an end run around the law of waste.
4. Rule Against Perpetuities
If the law of waste was designed to control the operation of divided
interests in land, then the rule against perpetuities was designed to strike
down certain future interests at the moment of their apparent creation.
On its face the rule was designed to make sure that, at the very least, at
some point in time, some designated persons were in a position to sell or
mortgage every interest in the land. Yet the formal character of the rule
assured that it achieved that purpose fitfully at best. Without offending
the rule, landowners so inclined could easily tie up land in ways that
could long postpone its sale. "To A for life, remainder to B, to C, to D, to
Z, all living persons etc. for life, remainder to the children of B now
living for etc." could divide land into tiny slivers for the better part of a
century without ever running afoul of any restrictions on the creation of
future interests. Even after valid contingent remainders vest, they may
still be hard to value and to protect. Thus, any future life estate is in fact
always contingent upon survivorship, even though the common law for
historical reasons always regarded these interests as vested at their
80. See L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 63, at § 1117. As an example, Thelusson v. Wood-
ford, 31 Eng. Rep. 117 (1799) aff'd, 32 Eng. Rep. 1030 (1805). The limitation called for accumula-
tions during the joint lives of children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren, with distribution
among certain descendants. The limitation was good under English common law, but prompted
passage of the so-called Thelusson Act. The trust itself was badly mismanaged and eroded by the
costs of litigation, so little was available for distribution at the end of the period. See R. MEGARRY
& H. WADE, supra note 60, at 265 n.53. In my view, the disastrous investment outcome made it less
likely that anyone else would attempt such an outlandish scheme. The substantial business risks of
these accumulations are reason enough to shy away from them.
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creation.'
If the common law was designed to secure "practical alienability," 82
then there was no reason to focus upon the distinction between vested
and contingent interests, which in no way reflects the ability to overcome
the bargaining problems that might prevent the unencumbered alienation
of the fee. Rather, the key question should have been the number of
various interests in the land and the uncertainty of their valuation. Yet
the vesting of remote interests is not even a plausible proxy for that ques-
tion, which the common law never sought to regulate at all. For exam-
ple, the standard rules on the entail only provided that the tenant in tail
in possession could alienate the fee simple. But the law did nothing to
prohibit the strict settlement where land was divided among the tenant
for life, the tenant in tail in remainder, and some subsequent remainders
or a reversion over that. 3 Likewise it is easy to draft limitations that
satisfy the rule against perpetuities while tying up property during the
lives of children and grandchildren, and, with a little ingenuity, for great-
grandchildren as well-should anyone be so minded. 4
There has never been a good functional explanation for the old rules.
The old saying was "let the lives be never so many, there must be a survi-
vor, and so it is but the length of that life; for Twisden used to say, the
candles were all lighted at once."85 Yet the image reflects the concern
with formalities, with bare possibilities, that so pervades the rule. The
business practicalities are quite otherwise. The more the candles, the
longer joint lives will tie up the title, and the graver the practical difficul-
ties of conveyance. Yet it is just these features that the categorical nature
of the common law ignores. The formal elegance of the rule, coupled
with the literary enthusiasms and excesses of Professor Leach, have been
81. R. MEGARRY & H. WADE, supra note 60, at 177-78. The conventional explanation for the
rule is that the contingency must govern something not implicit in the nature of the limitation itself.
More concretely, "to A for life, remainder to B for life if he survives A" add no new information to a
grant "to A for life, remainder to B for life." The survivorship condition would of course be critical
if the interest to B were a fee simple in remainder.
82. L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 63, at § 1115.
83. For a description of the strict settlement, usually attributable to Orlando Bridgman, the
great 17th century conveyancer, see A. SIMPSON, supra note 52, at 229-30, 233-41.
84, Barton Leach, the Dean of the Perpetuities scholars, has said: "In 35 years of practice,
largely connected with estate work, I have never found a testator or settlor who had any wish to
exceed the limits of the Rule in its most severe application." Quoted in Fetters, Perpetuities: The
Wait-And-See Disaster-A Brief Reply to Professor Maudsley, With A Few Asides to Professor Leach,
Simes, Wade, Dr. Morris, et al., 60 CORNELL L. REV. 380, 388 n.27 (1975).
85. Scatterwood v. Edge, 91 Eng. Rep. 203 (1697).
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primarily responsible for the enormous attention directed to the vagaries
of the rule: the fertile octogenarian, the unborn widow, the magic gravel
pits-stray cases all.16 What is sometimes forgotten, or at least under-
stated, is that in each case private responses can evade the rule, so that
throughout history the percentage of wealth transmitted at death but
caught by the rule is tiny. Today, virtually no wealth is redirected be-
cause of fear of its application. The clever and well counseled avoid the
abuses to which the naive and uninformed fall prey.
The more recent legislation and scholarship shows a growing prefer-
ence for the rule of "wait-and-see:" The validity of a contingent interest
is no longer determined by the conditions as they exist at the time of
grant, but by the way in which conditions unfold within the perpetuities
period. The existence of the wait-and-see approach seizes upon the fun-
damental asymmetry between past and future uncertainties.8 7 The sim-
ple intuition behind the wait-and-see rule is that time will cure original
doubts, which can never happen for uncertainties of the past. Nonethe-
less, wait-and-see generates a new generation of technical problems, well
understood in the literature. One recurrent issue is how one chooses the
appropriate "measuring lives" for the revised rule.8" The bottom line
seems to be that any clear list of proper lives is preferable to any abstract
principle of "causal relation" of the life chosen to the contested gift, or
anything else. But here too, the point is essentially a diversion from the
86. The "unborn widow" arises from a limitation "to A for life, remainder to his wife, remain-
der to the children who survive him and his wife." On the orthodox view, the limitation to the
children is bad because A's present wife and children could all die; A could remarry, with his second
wife surviving him by 21 years, such that the remainder in the children would not necessarily vest
within 21 years after some life in being.
The fertile octogenarian is a limitation "to my first grandchild to reach 25" made by a woman well
past the age of menopause. Here the limitation is bad if no grandchild has reached that age. All
present children and grandchildren may die, and the grantor may (biology notwithstanding) have
another child, and then die. That child in turn may have children who will only reach 25, outside
the perpetuity period.
The "magic gravel pits" example runs, "to A when my gravel pits are worked out," which may be
22 years later.
The classic exposition of the rule is Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REV. 638
(1938). In later years his tone became more strident, as he tended to overstate the harmful effects of
the rule. See, eg., Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign ofTerror, 65 HARV. L.
REV. 721 (1952); Leach, Perpetuities: Staying the Slaughter of the Innocents, 68 L. Q. REV. 35
(1952).
87. See supra p. 693.
88. See, eg., R. MAUDSLEY, THE MODERN LAW OF PERPETUITIES (1979); Fetters, supra note
84; Maudsley, Perpetuities: Reforming the Common-Law Rule-How to Wait and See, 60 CORNELL
L. REV. 355 (1975).
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major criticism. The original rule against perpetuities restricted very lit-
tle. Once liberalized, the rule restricts even less. The real question is
whether anyone should bother with the rule against perpetuities at all.89
The point is not that the modifications of the rule are good or bad policy.
It is that they are unimportant in light of the private and public alterna-
tives available to evade its application.
5. Restraints on Alienation
The concern with the power of alienation reveals itself not only in the
rule against perpetuities, but also in the rules that govern direct restraints
upon the rights of alienation. In one form or another, these rules place
express limitations upon the power which a tenant in possession has to
alienate his interest, whether a life estate or a fee simple. In virtually all
common law jurisdictions, restraints on alienation on the fee are invalid,
while in many jurisdictions, similar restrictions on more limited interests
are invalid as well.
The usual analysis of the problem suffers from the same ex post charac-
ter that bedevils much thinking about legal institutions. If the question is
viewed at the time that the original buyer wants to resell, then a clear
social loss occurs if the second sale is not consummated. But the usual
analysis does not explain why any initial buyer would agree to the origi-
nal restriction. Nor does it indicate the benefits that these restrictions
might have in the deployment of land. For example, a restriction within
five years from the date of original sale without the approval of the gran-
tor has benefits that offset the costs of these restrictions.9" The common-
unit developer often has a retained interest in the entire project, and the
ability to control resale should enhance the market for these retained
units, which makes it possible for the original sales to take place at a
lower price. Similar restrictions against the assignment of a leasehold
interest are routinely (and rightly) upheld on the ground that they pro-
tect the value of the landlord's reversion.
These restrictions on alienation are also a standard part of the modern
cooperative arrangement. There seems to be no good reason for treating
neighboring land differently from a reversion in the same land. Presuma-
bly, the only difference between them lies in the extent to which the value
89. Fetters clearly sees the point, see supra note 84 at 383-84. I believe that he misspeaks,
however, when he calls wait-and-see a disastrous reform. It is too unimportant to deserve that
condemnation.
90. See, e.g., Northwest Real Estate Co. v. Serio, 156 Md. 229, 144 A. 245 (1929).
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of one interest is tied to the value of the other. Yet, that is an issue which
should influence either the willingness to include the restriction in the
original sale or the nature of the restriction so included. It does not seem
like an occasion for direct regulation.
At its most general level, the point made in connection with the rule
against perpetuities is relevant here as well. 91 The restrictions under con-
sideration all arise by grant when there is no question of externality. In-
deed, in the commercial setting restraints on alienation arise as part of
bargain transfers so that any doubts about their functional value should
be obviated. Yet, ironically, the restrictions upon restraints of alienation
have more bite than those contained in the rule against perpetuities,
which generally applies to gratuitous transactions. The law of future in-
terests tolerates the division of land amongst many separate parties over
a long period of time. In contrast, the law on restraints on alienation
looks askance at limitations that are modest both in their duration and in
the number of parties whose consent is needed to undo the original re-
straint. We should not expect the restrictions to be indefinite in duration
because in many circumstances (i.e., when the developer has sold all his
units) there is no gain from continuing to observe the original restric-
tions. Nonetheless, legal restrictions on the power of disposition seem
well-entrenched. The rationale for these restraints is far less certain.
6. Behind the Trust
The previous section briefly covered the restrictions placed on specific
assets of land and argued that these restrictions address no serious social
problem. Most grotesque dispositions would not be favored by the par-
ties able to make them, while those restrictions that were imposed would
generally serve the interests of grantor and grantee alike. Moreover,
where there is a desire to protect future generations, private solutions
have developed which allow the separation of asset management from its
beneficial interest. It is possible, at reasonable cost, for the property
owner to have his cake and eat it too.
In this connection, the critical reforms have not taken place in the
doctrines governing estates, perpetuities and restraints. Instead, they
come from another corner, from the law of trusts. As owners more fre-
quently placed land behind a trust, the critical practical issue was not the
91. I have made the same argument also for restrictive covenants. See Epstein, Notice and
Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353 (1982).
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rule against perpetuities or the strict settlement; it was the power of the
trustee (or tenant for life)92 to deal with the property in question. During
the nineteenth century, for example, the English passed a series of set-
tled-land act reforms that enhanced the powers of trustees and tenants
for life to deal with property and to bind the remainderman, whose inter-
ests ran not against the property, but against purchase money that was
paid to the trustees.93 The powers given to the life tenant could not be
reduced by agreement, but further powers could be conferred upon him.
For well-drafted family settlements, little of consequence was changed, as
these powers generally had been provided. But with respect to home-
made settlements (of which there were some), the reforms meant a lower
chance of limiting the powers of the life tenant in ways that could bring
misfortune to the next generation.
The subsequent English land law reforms of 1925 took the earlier re-
gime a step further by abolishing as a matter of positive law all legal
estates except for the fee simple absolute in possession and the lease for a
term of years.94 Everything else was placed behind a mandatory trust,
where the trustees had power to convey the land over the objections of
the remaindermen whose rights now attached (as under the 1883 statute)
by operation of law to the reinvested proceeds. The statute thus intro-
duced a form of forced exchange whereby the remainderman's property
right in the thing was transformed into an interest in a fund. Use of these
mandatory settlements reduced the bargaining problem and made all the
earlier restrictions on the alienation of lands obsolete because now no one
could block the sale of specific assets by the trustees.95 In truth, the pro-
tections contempted under the English Settled Land Act (e.g., four trust-
ees and all sorts of formal safeguards) are probably too costly for the
peril at hand, so that most settled property goes through a more informal
and efficient trust for sale, where the tenant for life controls the disposi-
tion of the property.
In a more fundamental sense, one can ask whether the English legisla-
tion was necessary. A look at the state of land titles in England and
America suggests that even this reform is of very little importance. To be
92. The qualification is needed because under the English trust for sale the tenant for life had
the power to alienate the fee, while with the strict settlement under trust the trustee had the power.
Hence, it became vital to know which type of arrangement was in issue, a point that caused no little
confusion in the English case law. See R. MEGARRY & H. WADE, supra note 60, at 288-90.
93. See, eg., The Settled Land Act of 1882.
94. See Law of Property Act § 1 (1925).
95. See supra the comments of L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 63.
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sure, in America life tenants can sometimes obtain a court order to sell
the fee in the fashion routinely contemplated under the English statute. 96
But as the discussion of waste suggests, only in a tiny fraction of cases
does anyone create a legal remainder in land. What the English have
directed by statute, we have achieved by private convention and practice.
Elaborate family dispositions are routinely placed in trust, and in most
cases do not involve land. Bilateral monopoly problems are also reduced
in importance by allowing the tenant for life (usually the surviving
widow) to invade corpus without the permission of the remaindermen.
Other standard clauses achieve the same end by allocating certain kinds
of receipts (e.g., stock dividends) either to income or principal. As the
assets in trust are usually intangible and easily alienable, the system can
work with an ease not possible with the law of waste governing the land
itself. Family settlements have many complex features, but the estab-
lished modes represent as good a solution to the problem as we are apt to
find.
C. From Grant to Contract: Condominiums and Corporations
The rise of the trust is only one illustration of the transition from grant
to contract. Yet it would be incorrect to conclude that the trust has
ended concern with temporal issues. In part, the trust has only trans-
ferred this battleground to other arenas. This section will provide only
two short illustrations of the larger problem of governance by grant:
condominiums and cooperatives and the corporation. While ostensibly
these institutions govern very different subject matter, they raise common
issues of coordinated behavior.
L Condominiums and Cooperatives
Condominiums and cooperatives (and subdivisions generally) are ef-
forts to maximize the value of land and improvements. In each case,
prospective investors benefit from the purchase of a sound institutional
structure. Part of the price they pay is the cost of organizing the collec-
tive ownership that increases the value of individual units. The problems
that emerge do not concern the distribution of wealth within the family
across time. Yet they are most emphatically concerned with the distribu-
tion of wealth among strangers, both in the present and over time. In
order to make this collective enterprise viable, individual investors must
96. L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 63, at § 1117.
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receive some assurance that fellow investors or the original promoters
will not by one strategem or another confiscate their investment. Legal
rights of purchasers are an obvious source of protection.97 Often it is
possible to draft explicit contractual provisions about what will be done
and who will pay for it. The physical boundaries of the unit can be speci-
fied with great particularity. Where exact drafting is possible, there is
little need for discretion; and, hence, little danger of the abuse that dis-
cretion so often brings. One can think therefore of one component of the
condominium deed as a grant with the simplicity of "to A for life."
Still appearances are deceptive, for the grant of the individual unit is in
reality embedded in contract for governance. With the passage of time,
fixed provisions are less valuable because they ignore all information ac-
quired after the formation of the original contract. Contracting in con-
dominia and cooperatives comes down to a set of hard choices. Each
ownership interest may be made separate so collective governance is no
longer needed. Alternatively, the parties may try to negotiate modifica-
tions of the original agreement on an ad hoc basis. But here the combi-
nation of many parties and of long time frames makes bargaining
breakdowns a likely possibility.98 An unanimity requirement invites op-
portunistic behavior which is handled fitfully, at best, by the contract
doctrines of consideration, pre-existing duty, estoppel and economic
duress.99
For want of a better solution, the dominant tendency is to retain col-
lective ownership and to substitute explicit governance procedures both
for fixed rules or informal adjustment. The law of property thus reveals
its own constitutional dimension, in the private as well as in the public
sphere. Separation of powers is one concern. The original condominium
97. For more extensive treatment, see Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U.
PA. L. REV. 1519 (1982).
98. See, e.g., Goetz & Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089 (1981);
MacNeil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical,
and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 854 (1978). Both of these papers stress the way in
which time breaks down perfect contingent state contracts in two-party relationships. The general
solution is to resort to flexible performance standards and informal modification to keep matters on
an even keel. Provisions for arbitration of serious grievances represent an intermediate step toward
the types of contractual governance measures that emerge when the coordination problems must
overcome temporal obstacles in situations involving a large number of parties.
99. See, e.g., Aivazian, Trebilcock, & Penny, The Law of Contract Modifications: The Uncer-
tain Quest Fora Bench Mark of Enforceability, 22 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 173 (1984), which concludes
that no corner solution---either all modifications or no modifications will be enforced-will be so-
cially optimal, even after the costs of administration and uncertainty are taken into account.
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articles set up governance boards with powers to tax (by assessments,
ordinary and special) and to propose structural changes in the organiza-
tion of the body. The boards can hire specialized firms to manage day-
to-day affairs. The full membership has to approve certain matters (e.g.,
annual budgets) after notice and hearing. The original structure is set up
to protect against takeover of the governing body by faction. Bylaws or
routine amendments cannot become the vehicle to strip some owners of
valuable amenities (e.g., views or adjacent open spaces) or require them
to foot the bill for expenditures from which they do not share (propor-
tionately) in the benefit. The success of these institutional devices is
never assured and depends as much upon the preferences of the parties
governed as on the terms of the arrangements: the greater the divergence
of tastes, the greater the difficulties. Yet, it is abundantly clear that some
investment in contractual governance has a positive return for the parties
so governed.
The entire discussion thus assumes constitutional overtones on its two
central issues of representative government structure and vested rights.
Governance cannot depend upon unanimous consent because the
holdout problems become intractable. Yet, it cannot turn on simply ma-
jority rule because of the obvious dangers of expropriation by faction.
Instead, it tries to respond to a police power limitation (to control the
nuisance-like behavior by some) with a just compensation requirement,
whereby a majority can coerce the minority so long as it does not dis-
criminate against its interests by tests (measured by intent or effect?) that
are as difficult to administer as they are necessary to apply.
The bottom line is that whenever fixed contingent state contracts can-
not work to control the future, government must take its place. What is
striking about the condominium example is that the governance proce-
dures (like settled land and unlike a political constitution) can be created
by unanimous consent. At the outset, a single original owner has the
power to impose limitations that bind all against all. The need to insure
that newcomers and late arrivals live under the same set of rules is criti-
cal whenever the sale of units cannot be completed simultaneously. It is
for this reason that recordation and building plans °° assume such impor-
tance in the area. Recordation protects the interests of newcomers while
also giving information about the state of the title to latecomers. Build-
100. See generally, Reichman, Residential Private Governments: An Introductory Survey, 43 U.
CHI. L. REv. 253 (1976).
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ing plans insure that each and every purchaser is bound and benefited by
the articles of association notwithstanding when they are purchased. The
uniform set of front-end controls thus eliminates the possibility of strate-
gic behavior in the timing of the original purchases because it minimizes
bargaining nightmares that subsequently occur.
Within this institutional framework, one possible issue is whether the
law should include certain "outs," whereby the provisions of some ex-
press contract may be displaced when original circumstances have
changed. This entire issue is of great importance in the area of covenants
and servitudes, which exist in rich profusion in the collective modem
developments. The argument in favor of the exception is that without
these mechanisms the holdout problems will become impossible to
handle.
One favorite illustration of the point is the doctrine which allows the
abrogation or modification of restrictive covenants in land because of
"changed circumstances" over long periods of time. 10 Yet there are
weaknesses in that approach as well. No test of changed conditions can
easily determine whether conditions have changed enough for the princi-
ple to apply, especially since old restrictions may have some substantial
value even when the conditions have changed. In addition, the changes
that do occur may be such that they are better guarded against by ex-
plicit private governance provisions than by crude public control mecha-
nisms. Most long-term covenants are drafted by professionals. These
contracts can address the future one way or the other, although even the
best solution will have a high error rate. The condominium deeds can
make the covenants good for specific periods of time, or they can allow
for their extension, in whole or in part, by vote. Yet the bottom line
remains: if there is no reasonable assurance that an implied term will
have a better fit to the cases than the express contract, then there is no
reason to use it. Quite the contrary, there is good reason to encourage
private parties to deal with the contingency in advance so as to remove
the pressure from the courts.
2. Corporations
The same argument on governance applies to interests in corporations.
101. See Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV.
1352 (1982), criticized in part for its failure to take intergenerational claims into account in Sterk,
Freedom from Freedom of Contract: The Enduring Value of Servitude Restrictions, 70 IOWA L. REV.
615 (1985).
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Although they are organized for different purposes than condominiums,
corporations face exactly the same structural problems: how to obtain
money from investors with some assurance that they will receive an ap-
propriate return. Here the original drive towards the corporation is to
make sure that each participant in the joint venture is not a co-owner of
each individual asset in the firm. By placing the corporate veil between
the assets and the investors, the conveyancing and disposition of assets is
done far more easily by the firm. Similarly, at the shareholder level the
assignment of interests is facilitated because each share is, and is known
to be, perfectly fungible with all other interests, without a detailed exami-
nation of the status of the title for each particular asset.
Yet the imposition of a separate legal layer between the ultimate own-
ers and the assets they own again creates the explicit governance ques-
tion. Fixed contingent state contracts will not work because of the range
of contingencies that must be taken into account.1 "2 Again, the issue
quickly reduces to one of governance structures. The corporate pro-
moter occupies the same role as the original developer. In consequence,
this case too is blessed by the happy circumstance that amongst inves-
tors, there are no externalities in the original position. The subscription
contracts for the purchase of shares mediate all contacts among separate
parties. The promoter (like the settlor or developer) thereby places all
investors in privity with parties who both proceed and follow them. To
be sure, the time of purchase remains important; but its full value can be
captured in the price term of the arrangement, where it reflects only the
value of the underlying assets. The rights that shareholders have against
one another remain constant by class regardless of the time or price of
purchase. Accordingly, there is no way th-t one investor can strategi-
cally time the purchase of shares to obtain some advantage over his fel-
low investors, an effective prohibition that by controlling rentseeking
works to the mutual advantage of all.
It should come therefore as no surprise that the governance structures
needed to prevent the twin perils of holdout and expropriation with the
condominium and cooperative must emerge in the corporate context as
well. Conflicts of interest between directors and the shareholders are like
conflicts of interest between the condominium board and the unit own-
102. See, e.g., Fischel & Bradley, The Role of Liability and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law:
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis (unpublished manuscript). The article concludes that liability
rules are generally a poor way to secure performance. They are more expensive, given the errors and
cost of litigation, than other devices, including sales of corporate control.
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ers. The amendment of corporate charters raises the same issues as the
amendment of condominium charters. The sale of firm assets to outsid-
ers is like the sale of common condominium property. The right answer
to these questions is hardly uniform across different corporate enter-
prises: these matters are too sensitive to differences in scale and to the
informal relations between shareholders. It is unlikely therefore that any
uniform type of direct regulation, which must be drafted in the absence
of solid, firm specific information, will be as good as a private contract
that can take that firm specific information into account.
Once the corporate charter is negotiated, ex post opportunism, famil-
iar in the condominium context, must be addressed. The recent propos-
als to allow corporate boards to modify their corporate structures (with
supervoting shares and poison pills), without going to the shareholders,
show the dangers that can arise when management is given power to shift
control and, through it, wealth from one group of corporate investors to
another."13 As with condominiums, one rough test of whether a change
in individual rights and duties is desirable is whether that shift is pro rata
across the individuals. Where it is not, recapitalization is probably part
of a plan of partial confiscation, where the risks of contractual opportu-
nism have come home to roost.
3. From Corporation to Constitution: A Brief Post-Script
This quick summary of the future indicates that while contracting is
difficult, it generally affords the best answer for most questions of collec-
tive governance. Whether by trusts, condominium declarations or corpo-
rate charters, private contracts respond to similar perils in analogous
ways. Binding future arrangements entail a partial shift from substance
to process, from a concern with what will be done to a concern with who
will decide subject to what constraints. These contracting systems give
us a private analogue by which it becomes possible to understand collec-
tive governance in the political sphere. The one difference is that the
stakes are higher, given the governments' exercise of power over the lives
and deaths of their citizens. Moreover, the chances for success are lower,
103. See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059 (Del. 1985), upholding a poison
pill program introduced by management action, notwithstanding the manifest conflict of interest
between management and shareholders. For evidence that proposals that ward off takeover bids
reduce the value of the shares of the target corporation, see Easterbrook & Jarrell, Do Targets Gain
From Defeating Tender Offers?, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 277 (1984). See also Epstein, Why Restrain
Alienation, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 970, 984-86 (1985).
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and the dangers of abuse are greater because the happy circumstance of a
single original owner is now necessarily missing. Politics is doing busi-
ness with strangers when no one is in the position to choose his trading
partners. The cumbersome nature of government becomes more plausi-
ble, and even more acceptable, once it is recognized that private agree-
ments go to considerable cost to introduce similar safeguards against
opportunistic behavior even when they are less needed. In both the pub-
lic and private domain, everyone wants some assurance that he will see
his share of the gain from the collective enterprise. The question of a
constitution is the question of permanent structures of governance over
time. The building blocks for the public solution are found in voluntary
arrangements of the private law. 1" The Lockean theory of political obli-
gation started with the rules of original acquisition of property by first
possession and ended in the theory of constitutional government. The
connection is more complete and precise than perhaps even Locke knew.
104. I have stressed this theme in my recent book, EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 3.
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